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Commentary: The Servant, the Parasite, and the Enigma: A Tale of Three Ownership Structures and Their Affiliate Directors1

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  • James G. Combs

Abstract

In private family firms, affiliate directors are largely resource–providing servants of the family. In nonfamily public firms with dispersed ownership, affiliates are, figuratively speaking, symbiotic parasites loyally supporting their professional management hosts while extracting revenues for their home firms. The public family firm stands somewhere between and the affiliate directors in such firms are consequently an enigma. Jones, Makri, and Gomez–Mejia compare affiliate directors in public family firms with those in public nonfamily firms and find that they positively influence diversification strategy only in public family firms. They interpret this outcome as evidence that affiliate directors in public family firms act like the servants found in private family firms. I offer an alternative interpretation by suggesting that affiliate directors in public family firms are more successful versions of their parasitic cousins in public nonfamily firms. I draw attention to the Janus–headed nature of these directors to underscore why it is useful to study public family firms as a distinct ownership structure.

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  • James G. Combs, 2008. "Commentary: The Servant, the Parasite, and the Enigma: A Tale of Three Ownership Structures and Their Affiliate Directors1," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 32(6), pages 1027-1033, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:entthe:v:32:y:2008:i:6:p:1027-1033
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6520.2008.00270.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Carney & Marc Van Essen & Eric R. Gedajlovic & Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens, 2015. "What do we know about Private Family Firms? A Meta–Analytical Review," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 39(3), pages 513-544, May.
    2. Liliane Cristina Segura & Henrique Formigoni, 2014. "Influence of Control and Family Management in the Indebtedness of Brazilian Open Business: a Quantitative Study," Brazilian Business Review, Fucape Business School, vol. 11(6), pages 50-74, December.
    3. Rebeca García-Ramos & Belén Díaz-Díaz & Myriam García-Olalla, 2017. "Independent directors, large shareholders and firm performance: the generational stage of family businesses and the socioemotional wealth approach," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 119-156, January.
    4. Kimberly A. Eddleston & James J. Chrisman & Lloyd P. Steier & Jess H. Chua, 2010. "Governance and Trust in Family Firms: An Introduction," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 34(6), pages 1043-1056, November.
    5. Esra Memili & Kaustav Misra, 2015. "Corporate Governance Provisions, Family Involvement, and Firm Performance in Publicly Traded Family Firms," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 3(3), pages 1-36, July.
    6. James J. Chrisman & Lloyd P. Steier & Jess H. Chua, 2008. "Toward a Theoretical Basis for Understanding the Dynamics of Strategic Performance in Family Firms," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 32(6), pages 935-947, November.
    7. M. Carmen Díaz-Fernández & M. Rosario González-Rodríguez & Marek Pawlak & Biagio Simonetti, 2019. "Family firm’s management composition: the role played by family members’ age in TMT and supervisor levels," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 53(5), pages 2421-2438, September.
    8. Ryan Federo & Yuliya Ponomareva & Ruth V. Aguilera & Angel Saz‐Carranza & Carlos Losada, 2020. "Bringing owners back on board: A review of the role of ownership type in board governance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(6), pages 348-371, November.
    9. James J. Chrisman & Jess H. Chua & Allison W. Pearson & Tim Barnett, 2012. "Family Involvement, Family Influence, and Family–Centered Non–Economic Goals in Small Firms," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 36(2), pages 267-293, March.

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