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Eminent Domain: History and Economics

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  • Pavol Minárik

Abstract

The power of eminent domain is often considered to be the inherent power of the government and it is rarely questioned. There are two possible justifications for eminent domain. Either the government has a superior position to that of private owners, such as a feudal lord, or the power of eminent domain exists to prevent the problem of holdout, i.e. the problem of high transaction costs. This paper examines and contrasts the historical and economic approaches to eminent domain and shows the complementarity of these disciplines.

Suggested Citation

  • Pavol Minárik, 2015. "Eminent Domain: History and Economics," Littera Scripta, VSTE, vol. 8(2), pages 60-68, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:rsg:littra:2015-010
    DOI: 10.36708/LS.2015.I02.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, 1984. "The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 99(1), pages 71-92.
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