Some Economics of Global Warming
This paper reflects on the economics and politics of an international climate policy agreement. The international community has so far failed to design institutions and a compensation scheme that would lead to an abatement effort commensurate with the IPCC recommendations that it attempts tofollow. The paper first lays out what could be a proper institutional design, minimizing the impact of abatement on the world consumer’s income, and thereby making the fight against climate change more credible. It then sketches a governance mechanism as well as an approach to compensation. Finally, it concludes with a roadmap for the negotiation.
Volume (Year): 98 (2008)
Issue (Month): 6 (November-December)
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- GOLLIER Christian, 2008.
"Discounting with fat-tailed economic growth,"
LERNA Working Papers
08.19.263, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
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- Hahn, Robert W., 2000. "The Impact of Economics on Environmental Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 375-399, May.
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