The theory of the origin of the theory of public goods (conclusion)
The article critically examines the traditional theory of public goods, it is an established part of the theory of public finance. The author shows that this theory in the form in which it is treated by its creators and authors of modern textbooks, can serve no empirical explanation for the production of a good in the public sector, no regulatory justification for such production. Then, the article developed political economy concept that the fact that some goods are produced and provided by the state, is due to the interests of the state, seeking to build up their own wealth and political power. In this context, the very theory of public goods and its promotion are explained as part of a system of institutions, ensuring the preservation and expansion of the power and influence of the state in society.
Volume (Year): 5 (2015)
Issue (Month): ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Douglass C. North, 1988. "Ideology and Political/Economic Institutions," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 8(1), pages 15-28, Spring/Su.
- Holcombe, Randall G & Sobel, Russell S, 1995.
"Empirical Evidence on the Publicness of State Legislative Activities,"
Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 47-58, April.
- Holcombe, R.G. & Sobel, R.S., 1993. "Empirical Evidence on the Publicness of State Legislative Activities," Working Papers 1993_05_03, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
- Gonzalez, R A & Means, T S & Mehay, S L, 1993. "Empirical Tests of the Samuelsonian Publicness Parameter: Has the Right Hypothesis Been Tested?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(3), pages 523-534, November.
- Stigler, George J, 1970. "Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-10, April.
- Leland B. Yeager, 1985. "Rights, Contract, and Utility in Policy Espousal," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 5(1), pages 259-294, Spring/Su.
- Gordon, Scott, 1976. "The New Contractarians," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(3), pages 573-590, June.
- Hochman, Harold M & Rodgers, James D, 1969. "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 542-557, Part I Se. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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