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Was there a collusion? (Once again on the monopolistically high prices of Russian oil companies)

Listed author(s):
  • Yusupova, Guzel

    ()

    (NRU HSE)

  • Kiseleva, Olga

    ()

    (New school of economics)

Registered author(s):

    Legal structure "abuse of collective dominance" corresponds to the behavior of companies, well-known economist as a "tacit collusion": the interdependence of the sellers makes it profitable for them to maintain high prices even in the absence of an explicit agreement between them. For the Russian market, which are attended by the major oil companies, characterized by factors that really facilitate tacit collusion. However, the analysis showed that even in times of an alleged violation of antitrust laws (purpose monopolistically high prices as the abuse of dominant position), the actual prices of sellers may not correspond to the model of tacit collusion.

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    File URL: ftp://w82.ranepa.ru/rnp/ecopol/ep1549.pdf
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    Article provided by Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in its journal Economic Policy.

    Volume (Year): 4 (2015)
    Issue (Month): ()
    Pages: 178-195

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    Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1549
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    1. Andrey Shastitko, 2011. "Collective Dominance Through the Lens of Comparative Antitrust," Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International, vol. 8.
    2. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    3. Severin Boreinstein & Andrea Shepard, 1996. "Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 429-451, Autumn.
    4. Robert H. Porter, 1983. "A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 301-314, Autumn.
    5. Slade, Margaret E, 1987. "Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 499-516, June.
    6. Glenn Ellison, 1994. "Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 37-57, Spring.
    7. Andrew Eckert, 2013. "Empirical Studies Of Gasoline Retailing: A Guide To The Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 140-166, February.
    8. S. Avdasheva., 2011. "Illegality of Tacit Collusion in Russian Antitrust Legislation: Could Economists Be Useful to Generate Legal Rules?," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 5.
    9. Slade, Margaret E, 1998. "Strategic Motives for Vertical Separation: Evidence from Retail Gasoline Markets," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 84-113, April.
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