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Was there a collusion? (Once again on the monopolistically high prices of Russian oil companies)

Author

Listed:
  • Yusupova, Guzel

    () (NRU HSE)

  • Kiseleva, Olga

    () (New school of economics)

Abstract

Legal structure "abuse of collective dominance" corresponds to the behavior of companies, well-known economist as a "tacit collusion": the interdependence of the sellers makes it profitable for them to maintain high prices even in the absence of an explicit agreement between them. For the Russian market, which are attended by the major oil companies, characterized by factors that really facilitate tacit collusion. However, the analysis showed that even in times of an alleged violation of antitrust laws (purpose monopolistically high prices as the abuse of dominant position), the actual prices of sellers may not correspond to the model of tacit collusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Yusupova, Guzel & Kiseleva, Olga, 2015. "Was there a collusion? (Once again on the monopolistically high prices of Russian oil companies)," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 4, pages 178-195.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1549
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrey Shastitko, 2011. "Collective Dominance Through the Lens of Comparative Antitrust," Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International, vol. 8.
    2. Slade, Margaret E, 1987. "Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 499-516, June.
    3. Glenn Ellison, 1994. "Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 37-57, Spring.
    4. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    5. Severin Boreinstein & Andrea Shepard, 1996. "Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 429-451, Autumn.
    6. Andrew Eckert, 2013. "Empirical Studies Of Gasoline Retailing: A Guide To The Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 140-166, February.
    7. S. Avdasheva., 2011. "Illegality of Tacit Collusion in Russian Antitrust Legislation: Could Economists Be Useful to Generate Legal Rules?," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 5.
    8. Slade, Margaret E, 1998. "Strategic Motives for Vertical Separation: Evidence from Retail Gasoline Markets," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 84-113, April.
    9. Robert H. Porter, 1983. "A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 301-314, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    abuse of collective dominance; market power; collusion; the Russian market of petroleum products;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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