Was there a collusion? (Once again on the monopolistically high prices of Russian oil companies)
Legal structure "abuse of collective dominance" corresponds to the behavior of companies, well-known economist as a "tacit collusion": the interdependence of the sellers makes it profitable for them to maintain high prices even in the absence of an explicit agreement between them. For the Russian market, which are attended by the major oil companies, characterized by factors that really facilitate tacit collusion. However, the analysis showed that even in times of an alleged violation of antitrust laws (purpose monopolistically high prices as the abuse of dominant position), the actual prices of sellers may not correspond to the model of tacit collusion.
Volume (Year): 4 (2015)
Issue (Month): ()
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