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The Diagnosis of the Insider Trading During the Conflict of Shareholders of “VimpelCom” in 2005-2013

Author

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  • Chirkova, Elena

    () (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Petrov, Vladislav

    () (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

Abstract

This article presents the results of a study of insider trading during the corporate conflict of shareholders of OJSC “VimpelCom”. The study is based on an analysis of cumulative abnormal returns during the period prior to the publication of a news. In the study we analyzed 80 news about the conflict of shareholders of OJSC “VimpelCom” in 2005-2013 years. We found insider trading prior to the public statements made by “Alfa Group” representatives but not by Telenor officials. We have found the presence of a large-scale insider trading prior to the publication of the news about the courts verdicts of the Russian courts and news about government pressure.

Suggested Citation

  • Chirkova, Elena & Petrov, Vladislav, 2015. "The Diagnosis of the Insider Trading During the Conflict of Shareholders of “VimpelCom” in 2005-2013," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 2, pages 151-173.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1522
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    insider trading; cumulative abnormal return; shareholders’ conflict;

    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G19 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Other

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