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Competition issues in the procurement of capital-largest consumer products (lessons of antitrust case)
[Вопросы Конкуренции В Закупках Капиталоемкой Продукции Крупным Потребителем (Уроки Одного Антимонопольного Дела)]

Author

Listed:
  • Shastitko, Andrei (Шаститко, Андрей)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Golovanova, Svetlana (Голованова, Светлана)

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

The article is devoted to discussion of the recent antitrust case against the Russian manufacturers of large diameter pipes for violating the law "On Protection of Competition" in the part of the ban on a section of the market. The present case is a clear illustration of the importance of studying the details of institutional actions in qualification of market participants and their consequences. The analysis of the case with the application of modern economic theory shows that the hypothesis of collusion in the form of market sharing by territorial or other characteristics are not consistent with the active participation in this agreement the main consumer of LDP. At the same time the selected format interaction pipe group companies and OAO "Gazprom" - indicative planning - well explained from the perspective of reducing the risks in the contract terms of the scale of specific investments from the pipe manufacturers.

Suggested Citation

  • Shastitko, Andrei (Шаститко, Андрей) & Golovanova, Svetlana (Голованова, Светлана), 2014. "Competition issues in the procurement of capital-largest consumer products (lessons of antitrust case) [Вопросы Конкуренции В Закупках Капиталоемкой Продукции Крупным Потребителем (Уроки Одного Ант," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 67-89.
    • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1419
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    File URL: https://repec.ranepa.ru/rnp/ecopol/ep1419.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Williamson, Oliver, 2009. "The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 111-134, December.
    2. Sergio Ermacora & Senada Smajić, 2009. "The Make-or-Buy Decision in the Croatian Shipbuilding Industry: A Transaction Cost Economics Approach," South East European Journal of Economics and Business, Sciendo, vol. 4(1), pages 81-105, April.
    3. Ivaldi, Marc & Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Seabright, Paul & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "The Economics of Tacit Collusion," IDEI Working Papers 186, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrey Shastitko & Claude Ménard, 2017. "Discrete institutional alternatives: Theoretical and policy issues (Celebrating the 80 th anniversary of Ronald Coase's “Nature of the Firm”)," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-04011898, HAL.

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