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"Coalition clinch" against the Islamic order: the dynamics of market institutions dispute resolution in Dagestan


  • Varshaver, Evgeniy

    () (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Kruglova, Ekaterina

    () (Lomonosov Moscow State University)


In the article on the example of Dagestan shows how two social order, "the coalition clinch" and the Islamic order, coexisting in the same area, competing with each other. This is demonstrated by the institutions of dispute resolution. Institute of Islamic order, associated with lower transaction costs and a lower level of uncertainty, gradually spread in society, undermining the dominance of inefficient institutions "clinch a coalition." Constraints on diffusion of the new rules are the rules of start-up costs of development, and is currently the practice of the Islamic order are marginal.

Suggested Citation

  • Varshaver, Evgeniy & Kruglova, Ekaterina, 2015. ""Coalition clinch" against the Islamic order: the dynamics of market institutions dispute resolution in Dagestan," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 3, pages 89-112.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:1539

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Pejovich, Svetozar, 1994. "The Market for Institutions vs. Capitalism by Fiat: The Case of Eastern Europe," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 519-529.
    2. Jan Tinbergen, 1984. "Alternative Optimal Social Orders," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 23(1), pages 1-7.
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    More about this item


    polijuridism; social order; market institutions Sharia;

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements


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