Do Self-Committers Mind Other-Imposed Commitment? An Experiment on Weak Paternalism
This experiment investigates whether protEgEs judge paternalism by means of its consequences or on principled grounds. Subjects receive a payment for showing up early the next morning. The later they show up the less they get. ProtEgEs can self-commit to a speci?c show-up time or maintain spontaneity. By making this binary choice, protEgEs express their preference for liberty. Simultaneously, their patron is either paternalistic or liberal by making this choice on their behalf. We investigate whether self-committers' willingness to restrict their own freedom predicts their attitudes toward paternalism.
Volume (Year): 2 (2011)
Issue (Month): 40 (June)
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