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L’équilibre concurrentiel comme limite de suites d’équilibres stratégiques de Stackelberg


  • Boyer, Marcel

    (Département de Sciences économiques, Université de Montréal)

  • Moreaux, Michel



In this article, we consider an ordered Stackelberg framework. In such a context, leadership is the preferred position. We show, using a linear model, with constant average costs, that the larger the number of a firm's followers is, the larger its profit. However, as the number of firms increase, the industry's production converges to the competitive equilibrium level but the distribution of firms' size and profit remains significantly unequal. However, in terms of absolute profits, the rank advantage does disappear in the process. The convergence to a competitive equilibrium industry production level is preserved when we introduce fixed costs and replicate both the size of the market and the number of firms. Dans cet article, nous considérons le modèle de Stackelberg stricto sensu (dans lequel chaque agent a une stratégie en quantités) mais en introduisant une hiérarchie de firmes. On sait que dans ce cas, c’est le rôle de meneur qui procure un avantage. Nous montrons dans le cadre d’un modèle linéaire à coûts moyens constants que plus le nombre de subordonnés d’un joueur est élevé, plus son profit est élevé. Cependant, lorsque le nombre de joueurs augmente, d’une part la répartition des niveaux de production et de profit reste fondamentalement inégalitaire, mais d’autre part la production totale de l’industrie tend vers la production d’équilibre concurrentiel, convergence préservée en présence de coûts fixes lorsque l’on réplique simultanément la taille au marché et le nombre de firmes, de sorte que, en termes de profits absolus, l’avantage que procure le rang disparaît.

Suggested Citation

  • Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1985. "L’équilibre concurrentiel comme limite de suites d’équilibres stratégiques de Stackelberg," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 61(3), pages 299-315, septembre.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:61:y:1985:i:3:p:299-315

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1987. "On Stackelberg Equilibria with Differentiated Products: The Critical Role of the Strategy Space," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 217-230, December.
    2. Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1973. "Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(3), pages 467-501, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sébastien Mitraille & Michel Moreaux, 2013. "Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-Period Cournot Oligopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 852-874, December.
    2. MITRAILLE Sébastien & MOREAUX Michel, 2007. "Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Hierarchy in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly," LERNA Working Papers 07.02.223, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    3. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1985. "La convergence d’équilibres stratégiques en prix-quantités vers l’équilibre concurrentiel," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 61(4), pages 411-427, décembre.

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