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L'equilibre Concurrentiel Comme Limite de Suites D'equilibres Strategiques de Stackelberg

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  • Boyer, M.
  • Moreaux, M.

Abstract

Dans Cet Article, Nous Considerons D'abord le Modele de Stackelberg Stricto Sensu (Dans Lequel Chaque Agent a une Strategie En Quantites) Mais En Introduisant une Hierarchie de Firmes. on Sait Que Dans Ce Cas, C'est le Role de Meneur Qui Procure un Avantage. Nous Montrons Dans le Cadre D'un Modele Lineaire a Couts Moyens Constants Que Plus le Nombre de Subordonnes D'un Joueur Est Eleve, Plus Son Profit Est Eleve. Cependant, Lorsque le Nombre de Joueurs Augmente, D'une Part la Repartition des Niveaux de Production et de Profit Reste Fondamentalement Inegalitaire, Mais D'autre Part la Production Totale de L'industrie Tend Vers la Production D' Equilibre Concurrentiel (Convergence Preservee En Presence de Couts Fixes Lorsque L'on Replique Simultanement la Taille au Marche et le Nombre de Firmes), de Sorte Que, En Termes de Profits Absolus, L'avantage Que Procure le Rang Disparait. le Second Type de Modele de Hierarchie Que Nous Etudions Est Celui Dans Lequel Chaque Agent Choisit un Couple Prix-Quantite. Dans Ce Type de Modele, le Meneur Rationne une Partie de la Clientele a Laquelle le Suiveur Pourra Vendre a un Prix Plus Eleve. L'avantage Appartient Alors au Suiveur, et Non au Meneur Contrairement au Modele En Qantites. Nous Generalisons Ce Modele a une Hierarchie Comprenant un Nombre Quelconque de Firmes et Nous Montrons Que la Configuration D' Equilibre de L'industrie Tend Vers une Configuration "Quasi-Concurrentielle" : la Production Totale Tend Vers la Production Concurrentielle, le Prix de Vente de N'importe Quelle Firme D'un Rang Fixe Tend Vers le Prix D' Equilibre Concurrentiel, et le Poids des Firmes Dont le Prix de Vente Est Superieur D'un Certain Montant au Prix D'equilibre Concurrentiel Tend Vers Zero Egalement, Quel Que Soit Ce Montant: Par Ailleurs, Il Y a Rationnement a Tous les Niveaux.

Suggested Citation

  • Boyer, M. & Moreaux, M., 1985. "L'equilibre Concurrentiel Comme Limite de Suites D'equilibres Strategiques de Stackelberg," Cahiers de recherche 8527, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:8527
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1987. "On Stackelberg Equilibria with Differentiated Products: The Critical Role of the Strategy Space," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 217-230, December.
    2. Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1973. "Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(3), pages 467-501, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. MITRAILLE Sébastien & MOREAUX Michel, 2007. "Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Hierarchy in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly," LERNA Working Papers 07.02.223, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    2. Sébastien Mitraille & Michel Moreaux, 2013. "Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two‐Period Cournot Oligopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 852-874, December.
    3. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1985. "La convergence d’équilibres stratégiques en prix-quantités vers l’équilibre concurrentiel," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 61(4), pages 411-427, décembre.

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