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On Stackelberg Equilibria with Differentiated Products: the Critical Role of the Strategy Space


  • Boyer, M.
  • Moreaux, M.


Nous Considerons Dans Cet Article un Modele de Duopole Avec Produits Differencies; Nous Montrons Que le Caractere Substituts Vs Complements de Ces Produits Est un Facteur Important Dans la Determination du Mode de Concurrence Strategique (Cournot-Bertrand, Nash Mixte, Stackelberg; En Prix Ou Quantites) Que L'on Est Susceptible D'observer. Si les Produits Sont Substituts (Complements), la Concurrence Sera du Type Cournot (Bertrand) Plutot Que du Type Nash Mixte a Moins Qu'une Firme Puisse Affirmer Son Leadership et Forcer une Concurrence a la Stackelberg Mais Quel Soit le Role Tenu Par une Firme, Il Sera Preferable Pour Elle Que la Concurrence S'exprime En Quantite (Prix). Par Ailleurs, la Concurrence a la Bertrand Est Toujours la Meilleure du Point de Vue des Consommateurs et du Point de Vue de L'efficacite Sociale, et Ce, Que les Produits Soient Susbtituts Ou Complements.

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  • Boyer, M. & Moreaux, M., 1985. "On Stackelberg Equilibria with Differentiated Products: the Critical Role of the Strategy Space," Cahiers de recherche 8524, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:8524

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Eric A. Hanushek, 1979. "Conceptual and Empirical Issues in the Estimation of Educational Production Functions," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 14(3), pages 351-388.
    2. Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G, 1981. "Several Tests for Model Specification in the Presence of Alternative Hypotheses," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 781-793, May.
    3. Summers, Anita A & Wolfe, Barbara L, 1977. "Do Schools Make a Difference?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(4), pages 639-652, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lambertini, Luca, 1997. "Prisoners' Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 181-191, November.
    2. Thierry Lafay, 2010. "A linear generalization of Stackelberg’s model," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 317-326, August.
    3. Banerjee, Dyuti S. & Chatterjee, Ishita, 2014. "Exploring Stackelberg profit ordering under asymmetric product differentiation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 309-315.
    4. Lambertini, Luca, 2000. "Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 47(5), pages 550-570, November.
    5. Scrimitore, Marcella, 2010. "Managerial Incentives and Stackelberg Equilibria in Oligopoly," MPRA Paper 24245, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Lambertini, Luca, 1997. "Unicity of the equilibrium in the unconstrained Hotelling model," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 785-798, November.
    7. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1985. "L’équilibre concurrentiel comme limite de suites d’équilibres stratégiques de Stackelberg," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 61(3), pages 299-315, septembre.
    8. Luciano Fanti, 2016. "Endogenous timing under price competition and unions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 401-413, December.
    9. Hirose, Kosuke & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2017. "Comparing Welfare and Profit in Quantity and Price Competition within Stackelberg Mixed Duopolies," MPRA Paper 77700, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. L. Lambertini, 1997. "Time Consistency in Games of Timing," Working Papers 302, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    11. F. Delbono & L. Lambertini, 2016. "Choosing Roles under Supply Function Competition," Working Papers wp1069, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    12. Acharyya, Rajat & Marjit, Sugata, 1998. "To Liberalize or Not to Liberalize an LDC-Market with an Inefficient Incumbent," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 277-296.
    13. Goddard, Ellen W. & Shank, Benjamin & Panter, Chris & Nilsson, Tomas K.H. & Cash, Sean B., 2007. "Canadian Chicken Industry: Consumer Preferences, Industry Structure and Producer Benefits from Investment in Research and Advertising," Project Report Series 52088, University of Alberta, Department of Resource Economics and Environmental Sociology.
    14. L. Lambertini & S. Poddar & D. Sasaki, 1998. "Price versus Quantity Competition with Cost Sharing," Working Papers 343, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    15. Sang-Ho Lee, 2002. "Pricing, Quality-Setting, and Order of Plays in an Online Information Market," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 1(3), pages 179-191, December.
    16. Luca Lambertini, 2000. "Extended Games Played by Managerial Firms," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 51(2), pages 274-283, June.
    17. Kovenock, Dan & Widdows, Kealoha, 1998. "Price leadership and asymmetric price rigidity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 167-187, February.
    18. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1985. "La convergence d’équilibres stratégiques en prix-quantités vers l’équilibre concurrentiel," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 61(4), pages 411-427, décembre.
    19. Giulio ECCHIA & Luca LAMBERTINI, 2001. "Endogenous Timing and Quality Standards in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2001021, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    20. L. Lambertini, 1996. "The International Coordination of Monetary Policy: A Game-Theoretic Reformulation," Working Papers 250, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    21. L. Lambertini, 1995. "Cournot Vs Stackelberg Equilibria With Entrepreneurial and Labour Managed Firms," Working Papers 217, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.


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