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The Filibuster: A Means to Preserve the Voice of “We the People”

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  • Anna M. Cox

Abstract

The Senatorial practice of the filibuster has a long history of being an established fixture in the U.S. Senate. The filibuster, a senatorial tool and tactic of extended or unlimited debate has a constitutional basis, reason and purpose. The filibuster when implemented in accordance with its constitutional basis can maintain the checks and balance of governmental institutions, preserve true representation of “We the People”, protect the individual liberties of the American citizen and the rights of the minority. Thus without the preservation of the filibuster the Senate’s ability to conduct their legislative and representative responsibilities on the behalf of their constituents they represent would be in severe jeopardy. Consequently, the Senate must take the position of doing its due diligence to preserve and sustain the fundamental practice of the filibuster for the American citizenry for whom they represent.

Suggested Citation

  • Anna M. Cox, 2018. "The Filibuster: A Means to Preserve the Voice of “We the People”," International Journal of Social Science Studies, Redfame publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 79-95, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:rfa:journl:v:6:y:2018:i:3:p:79-95
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Coleman, John J., 1999. "Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 821-835, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    article 1: sec 5; senate; filibuster; cloture; Rule XXII; checks and balances; popular sovereignty; “We the People’;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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