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The impact of political uncertainty on institutional ownership

Author

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  • Francis, Bill B.
  • Hasan, Iftekhar
  • Yun, Zhu

Abstract

This paper provides original evidence from institutional investors that political uncertainty during presidential elections greatly affects investment. Using U.S. institutional ownership data from 1981 to 2010, we find that institutions significantly reduce their holdings of common stock by 0.76 to 2.1 percentage points during election years. More specifically, institutions tend to sell large proportions of their positions when Republicans win presidential elections and then keep their positions at below-average levels through the first year of the new administration. Conversely, when Democrats win presidential elections, institutions tend to keep their positions at above-average levels for the first year of the new administration. The difference in ownership rises to 2.4% by the end of the first year of new administration. Changes in institutional ownership in election years are sensitive to the uncertainty of the outcome. Our results also show that institutions benefit from these holding strategies during the pre-election periods.

Suggested Citation

  • Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Yun, Zhu, 2013. "The impact of political uncertainty on institutional ownership," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 27/2013, Bank of Finland.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bofrdp:rdp2013_027
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    2. Jian, Jian-hui & Hu, Dan & Tian, Haiyan & Long, Chengfeng & Yang, Fan, 2023. "Political uncertainty, officials’ characteristics heterogeneity and firm cost stickiness," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 776-791.
    3. Daniel Ferreira Caixe & Pedro Cesar Pestana Pavan & Natália Diniz Maganini & Hsia Hua Sheng, 2024. "Foreign Institutional Ownership and Firm Value: Evidence of “Locust Foreign Capital” in Brazil," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 60(2), pages 310-327, January.
    4. Rahim, Imad & Mian, Rehman U. & Mian, Affan, 2024. "Country-level heterogeneity in foreign institutional investment horizons and firm value," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    5. Zhou, Jian & Lei, Xiaodong, 2025. "ESG rating uncertainty and corporate financial misconduct," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    6. Gaies, Brahim & Nakhli, Mohamed Sahbi & Sahut, Jean-Michel, 2024. "Unravelling the complex interactions between sentiment of uncertainty and foreign capital flows: Evidence from Brazil and South Korea," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    7. Wang, Yueyang, 2025. "The silent cost of biodiversity loss: Unveiling its impact on institutional ownership," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    8. Cao, Yuqiang & Li, Chenglin & Liu, Xinghe & Lu, Meiting & Shan, Yaowen, 2022. "Economic policy uncertainty and debt allocation within business groups," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    9. Kershen Huang & Chenguang Shang, 2024. "Does informal governance matter to institutional investors? Evidence from social capital," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 59(2), pages 433-457, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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