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Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness

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  • Coleman, John J.

Abstract

Revisionist accounts conclude that divided and unified government do not differ significantly in the production of “important†public policy. I argue instead that when one theoretically reclaims the concerns about party responsiveness and institutional features of American politics that have animated party government scholars, unified government is significantly more productive than divided government. Employing a range of measures of important legislative enactments in the postwar period, I find that unified government produces greater quantities of significant enactments and is more responsive to the public mood than is divided government. The evidence suggests that parties do, as party government theorists maintain, generate incentives to cooperation that help transcend some of the policymaking gaps created by the Constitution.

Suggested Citation

  • Coleman, John J., 1999. "Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 821-835, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:93:y:1999:i:04:p:821-835_21
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    Cited by:

    1. Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, 2009. "Divided government and US federal rulemaking," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 3(2), pages 128-144, June.
    2. Myunghoon Kang, 2017. "Representation, sophisticated voting, and the size of the gridlock region," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(4), pages 623-646, October.
    3. Ade, Florian & Freier, Ronny, 2013. "Divided government versus incumbency externality effect—Quasi-experimental evidence on multiple voting decisions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-20.
    4. Beyer, Deborah B. & Fan, Zaifeng S., 2023. "The calming effects of conflict: The impact of partisan conflict on market volatility," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    5. Sojli, Elvira & Tham, Wing Wah, 2015. "Divided governments and futures prices," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 187(2), pages 622-633.
    6. Pablo Garofalo & Daniel Lema & Jorge M. Streb, 2020. "Political budget cycles and voting within a federal country: The influence of political alignment," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 305-334, July.
    7. Schelker, Mark, 2018. "Lame ducks and divided government: How voters control the unaccountable," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 131-144.
    8. Cipullo, Davide & Reslow, André, 2022. "Electoral cycles in macroeconomic forecasts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 307-340.
    9. Anna M. Cox, 2018. "The Filibuster: A Means to Preserve the Voice of “We the People”," International Journal of Social Science Studies, Redfame publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 79-95, March.
    10. Robert Pahre, 2001. "Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary, Sweden-Norway and the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 2(2), pages 131-162, June.
    11. Matthew N. Beckmann & Anthony J. McGann, 2008. "Navigating the Legislative Divide," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 201-220, April.
    12. Below, Amy, 2013. "Obstacles in energy security: An analysis of congressional and presidential framing in the United States," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 860-868.
    13. Tonja Jacobi, 2009. "The Role of Politics and Economics in Explaining Variation in Litigation Rates in the U.S. States," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 205-233, January.
    14. Christopher R. Berry & Barry C. Burden & William G. Howell, 2010. "After Enactment: The Lives and Deaths of Federal Programs," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 1-17, January.
    15. Dimiter Toshkov, 2011. "Public opinion and policy output in the European Union: A lost relationship," European Union Politics, , vol. 12(2), pages 169-191, June.
    16. Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Zhu, Yun, 2021. "The impact of political uncertainty on institutional ownership," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    17. Cheng, Mengyao, 2022. "Legislative gridlock and stock return dispersion around roll-call votes," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    18. Thomas Holyoke & Jeffrey Henig & Heath Brown & Natalie Lacireno-Paquet, 2009. "Policy dynamics and the evolution of state charter school laws," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 42(1), pages 33-55, February.
    19. Manow, Philip & Burkhart, Simone, 2004. "Legislative Autolimitation under Divided Government: Evidence from the German Case, 1976-2002," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/11, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    20. Montone, Maurizio, 2022. "Does the U.S. president affect the stock market?," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    21. Matthew C. Stephenson, 2013. "Does Separation of Powers Promote Stability and Moderation?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 331-368.
    22. Nathan Monroe, 2010. "The policy impact of unified government: evidence from 2000 to 2002," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(1), pages 111-124, January.

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