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La reciprocidad y la paradoja del votante

  • Jorge Andrés Gallego

    ()

    (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

This article shows that for a citizen with reciprocal preferences, voting can be a rational act. Even in elections with many voters, when the probability of being the pivotal voter is close to zero, the utility generated by strong reciprocal sentiments can compensate the material costs of voting. This paper offers a behavioral model with social preferences that represents the conditions that make voting more attractive than abstention. Using the dynamics of replication to explore the voting game evolution, it concludes that positive reciprocal sentiments promote voting for the candidate in power, while negative reciprocity promotes abstention or voting for a rival candidate.

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File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/jgallego16.pdf
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Article provided by Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía in its journal Revista de Economía Institucional.

Volume (Year): 9 (2007)
Issue (Month): 16 (January-June)
Pages: 149-188

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Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:9:y:2007:i:16:p:149-188
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  3. Charness, Gary & Rabin, Matthew, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3d04q5sm, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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  7. Herbert Gintis & Samuel Bowles & Robert T. Boyd & Ernst Fehr (ed.), 2006. "Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262572370, June.
  8. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2001. "A Theory of Reciprocity," CEPR Discussion Papers 3014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  10. Chamberlain, Gary & Rothschild, Michael, 1981. "A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 152-162, August.
  11. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  12. Jonathan Bendor & Sunil Kumar & David A. Siegel, 2010. "Adaptively Rational Retrospective Voting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(1), pages 26-63, January.
  13. Cabrales, Antonio, 2000. "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(2), pages 451-81, May.
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  16. Binmore, K. & samuelson, L., 1996. "Muddling Through : Noisy Equilibrium Section," Working papers 9410r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  17. Aaron Edlin & Andrew Gelman & Noah Kaplan, 2007. "Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote to Improve the Well-Being of Others," NBER Working Papers 13562, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Matthew Rabin., 1992. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Economics Working Papers 92-199, University of California at Berkeley.
  19. Fong, Christina M. & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 2006. "Strong reciprocity and the welfare state," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Elsevier.
  20. Henrich, Joseph & Boyd, Robert & Bowles, Samuel & Camerer, Colin & Fehr, Ernst & Gintis, Herbert (ed.), 2004. "Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199262052, March.
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