Fallas del mercado de la salud en Colombia: el caso de la insuficiencia renal crónica
Chronic renal insufficiency is one of the highest cost pathologies of greater financial impact for the general system of social security health care in Colombia. High-cost case concentration in some health entities made it necessary to distribute resources and patients to other entities in order to counteract the financial unbalance. This paper proposes that demand induction is the principal failure in this case. It presents some hypotheses regarding incentives facing firms in an oligopolic market and argues for the necessity of regulatory intervention in prices and quality and, especially, prevention.
Volume (Year): 7 (2005)
Issue (Month): 12 (January-June)
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- McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Physician agency," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 461-536 Elsevier.
- T Rice & R Labelle, 1989. "Do Physicians Induce Demand for Medical Service?," Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis Working Paper Series 18, Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis (CHEPA), McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada.
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