Hurwicz y el juez de última instancia
When receiving the Nobel Prize, Hurwicz took up the question “who is watching the guards?” and considered two approaches. One pessimistic, inspired by Juvenal, which leads to an infinite sequence of guards, and one idealistic, derived from the Platonic dialogues. The guard cannot get drunk, and if he does, he should resign. Although this closure of first instance does not happen in the real world, neither does Juvenal’s pessimism make sense. Society always finds a reasonable closure instance, but this solution is suboptimal and is plagued with impurities and illegalities. The leading strategy may be part of a set of illegal alternatives. Implementation is successful if the equilibrium corresponds to the legislator’s purposes. Every implementation can be improved and it is never entirely successful. Implementation mechanisms determine how the social welfare function is reached, which affects at the same time the private property prices and the consumption structure, so the market configuration depends on the kind of implementation and how the close of the last instance is made.
Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 19 (July-December)
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- Leonid Hurwicz, 2008.
"But Who Will Guard the Guardians?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 577-585, June.
- Hurwicz, Leonid, 2007. "But Who Will Guard the Guardians?," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2007-3, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Robert J. Aumann, 2007. "War and Peace," Chapters,in: Augustin Cournot: Modelling Economics, chapter 5 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Robert J. Aumann, 2005. "War and Peace," Discussion Paper Series dp428, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Robert J. Aumann, 2006. "War and Peace," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000332, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Aumann, Robert J., 2005. "War and Peace," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2005-4, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Hurwicz, Leonid, 1973. "The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 1-30, May.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Theodore W. Schultz, 1962. "Reflections on Investment in Man," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 1-1.
- Arrow, Kenneth J, 1986. "Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages 385-399, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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