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Barriers to network-specific investment

Author

Listed:
  • Antoine Martin

    (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)

  • Michael Orlando

Abstract

We examine incentives for network-specific investment and consider the implications for network governance. We model a two-sided market in which participants making payments over a network platform can invest in a technology that reduces the marginal cost of using the platform. A network effect results in multiple equilibria -- either all agents invest and use of the platform is high or no agents invest and use of the platform is low. The high-use equilibrium can be implemented if commitment is feasible. When the platform cannot commit to usage fees, investment in the platform-specific technology will be held-up, thus implementing the low-investment equilibrium. As a result, governance structures necessary to achieve commitment will be preferred to those necessary merely to achieve coordination. For example, mutual ownership by users of a network platform may emerge where users face risk of ex-post renegotiation. Such a governance structure will also be sufficient to avoid low investment attributable to the network effect. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • Antoine Martin & Michael Orlando, 2007. "Barriers to network-specific investment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(4), pages 705-728, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:06-205
    DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2007.03.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kevin Boudreau, 2010. "Open Platform Strategies and Innovation: Granting Access vs. Devolving Control," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(10), pages 1849-1872, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Network; Hold-up; Commitment; Two-sided market; Payments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E59 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Other
    • G29 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Other
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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