Why Do Superstars Exist? Talent, Fame and Power
In the last few years the superstar phenomenon has found wide circulation, thus increasing the number of people who earn massive incomes thanks to their work. The main aim of this article is to examine the various hypotheses advanced to explain the phenomenon: they can be identified with three basic typologies: talent, fame and power. We analyse these typologies and highlight the role of certain complementary - sometimes disregarded - hypotheses, such as the characteristics of technology and the assumptions on market competition. By so doing we can evaluate whether the superstars’ remunerations are compatible with perfect competition and may represent the right recompense for special individual skills, commonly defined as talent.
Volume (Year): (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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