IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rar/journl/0204.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why Do Superstars Exist? Talent, Fame and Power

Author

Listed:
  • Alessandro Tampieri

Abstract

In the last few years the superstar phenomenon has found wide circulation, thus increasing the number of people who earn massive incomes thanks to their work. The main aim of this article is to examine the various hypotheses advanced to explain the phenomenon: they can be identified with three basic typologies: talent, fame and power. We analyse these typologies and highlight the role of certain complementary - sometimes disregarded - hypotheses, such as the characteristics of technology and the assumptions on market competition. By so doing we can evaluate whether the superstars’ remunerations are compatible with perfect competition and may represent the right recompense for special individual skills, commonly defined as talent.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Tampieri, 2011. "Why Do Superstars Exist? Talent, Fame and Power," QA - Rivista dell'Associazione Rossi-Doria, Associazione Rossi Doria, issue 1, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:rar:journl:0204
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Riviste.asp?IDArticolo=41846&Tipo=Articolo%20PDF&lingua=en
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Claudio Lucifora & Rob Simmons, 2003. "Superstar Effects in Sport," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 4(1), pages 35-55, February.
    2. Hamlen, William A, Jr, 1991. "Superstardom in Popular Music: Empirical Evidence," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(4), pages 729-733, November.
    3. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 1994. "What do firms do with cash windfalls?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 337-360, December.
    4. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    5. Core, John E. & Holthausen, Robert W. & Larcker, David F., 1999. "Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 371-406, March.
    6. Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, 2003. "Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2351-2374, December.
    7. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2001. "Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(3), pages 901-932.
    8. Richard M. Cyert & Sok-Hyon Kang & Praveen Kumar, 2002. "Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(4), pages 453-469, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Superstar; Talent; Fame; Power;

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rar:journl:0204. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/rossiea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.