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An analysis of the ECU as an invoicing currency in international trade in the period 1983-1990

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  • M. VAN LEUVENSTEIJN

    (University of Nijmegen)

Abstract

In December 1991 the European Council in Maastricht provided for the introduction of a single European currency. This decision was motivated partly by the belief that a single currency would reduce the transaction costs within the European Union. An assessment is undertaken of the contribution to cost reduction of the ECU (European Currency Unit) as an invoicing currency in the period from 1983 to 1990.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Van Leuvensteijn, 1994. "An analysis of the ECU as an invoicing currency in international trade in the period 1983-1990," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 47(188), pages 53-74.
    • Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:1994:12
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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10521/10406
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Donnenfeld, Shabtai & Zilcha, Itzhak, 1991. "Pricing of Exports and Exchange Rate Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1009-1022, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ayoub Yousefi, 2000. "Merchandise Trade Balances of Less Developed Countries and Exchange Rate of the U.S. Dollar: Cases of Iran, Venezuela & Saudi Arabia," Working Papers 00002, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2000.
    2. Ranki, Sinimaaria, 1995. "On the role of the single currency ECU," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 7/1995, Bank of Finland.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration

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