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Formation du soutien politique, modalités institutionnelles de l'intégration européenne et crise du S.M.E

  • Stefano Palombarini
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    [fre] L'origine de la crise du S.M.E. « à bande étroite » est identifiée dans la réduction de l'espace pour la reproduction du soutien politique que nécessite tout accord de change. Le premier modèle présenté montre la faiblesse structurelle d'un régime de changes « fixes mais ajustables » dont les pays membres ne coopèrent pas sur le terrain de la politique monétaire et fiscale. Les contradictions du système éclatent au moment où le pays « leader » dans la détermination du taux d'intérêt opère une restriction monétaire et l'Europe traverse une phase de stagnation de l'activité économique. Un cercle vicieux est alors activé ; la seule réponse viable consisterait dans une politique coopérative qui prévoie le renforcement du budget communautaire, la codétermination du taux d'intérêt et la mise en place d'un mécanisme coopératif de défense des parités. A l'aide du deuxième modèle, concernant les effets de la réunification allemande, on montre toutefois la difficulté de concilier coopération et souveraineté des Etats nationaux en termes de politique économique. La politique restrictive allemande est interprétée comme le résultat du manque de coopération dans le financement des coûts de la réunification : les conditions pour aboutir à une politique coopérative auraient été beaucoup moins restrictives en présence d'un organisme communautaire doué du pouvoir de déterminer la politique monétaire et le transfert vers l'Allemagne. [eng] The article deals with the relationship between the bonds created by the integration process with economic policy and to wath extent it can be politically maintained. The first of the two models shows that an inflexible exchange system adopted by the countries wich do not share a monetary and fiscal policy is frail in itself. The exchange system can be politically maintained if it is consistent with a certain growth rate, thus setting a maximum limit to the rate of interest. In an inflexible exchange system every country (except the country leader wich as determined the monetary policy) has to reduce the relative risk premium to act on internal rate of interest : importation has to be squeezed and consequently the growth rate as well. The recessive phase in Europe makes the bond with the growth rate stiff ; a vicious circle is activated and a glaring contradiction within the system itself emerges. The model indicates two possible strategies to make the bond loose : one, is a non cooperative strategy of competitive disinflation (as it corresponds to a zero amount game), the other is a cooperative one consisting in a reinforced reliability on the exchange parities, in a development of the budget policy and in co-determining the interest rate within the EC. These three measures interact in a process of reciprocal reinforcement and the result is a positive amount game. The competitive disinflation policy is the only one possible if we consider the institutional situation peculiar to the present integration process. A second model concerning the process of reunification in Germany, shows how difficult it is to reach cooperation through negotiation among various national organisms. The model indicates that German restrictive monetary policy doesn't necessarily depend on the Bundesbank's specific attitude : it can be interpreted as the most appropriate policy for German aims in a non cooperative situation. Were there communitarian organismes endowed with real managing powers in an economic policy, the answer to the German reunification would consist in the common financing of its costs and in a monetary expansive policy involving Europe.

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    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

    Volume (Year): 11 (1996)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 145-166

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1996_num_11_4_1011
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1996.1011
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    1. Barry Eichengreen., 1990. "One Money for Europe? Lessons from the US Currency Union," Economics Working Papers 90-132, University of California at Berkeley.
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