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Apprentissage collectif et incitations. Une approche par l'apprentissage gestuel

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  • Suzanne Quiers-Valette

Abstract

[fre] Un nombre grandissant d'économistes s'intéresse aux notions d'apprentissage organisationnel et/ou d'apprentissage collectif (ce dernier étant assimilé au social learning proposé parA.O. Hirschman en 1954). Mais peu d'entre eux prennent en compte le lien qui unit le processus d'apprentissage aux incitations. Cet article a pour but de souligner l'importance de ce lien. Dans une première partie, on montre que si on peut logiquement concevoir, comme le fait le modèle dominant, une incitation sans apprentissage, la relation inverse (i.e. : apprentissage sans incita­tion) n'est pas théoriquement justifiée. La seconde partie illustre cette hypothèse en introduisant la notion, directement inspirée de Biaise Pascal, d'« apprentissage gestuel » qui ne se réduit pas à une question d'imitation ou d'aléa moral et qui peut expliquer le maintien, apparemment paradoxal, de certaines politiques économiques inefficaces. [eng] An increasing number of economists have become interested in the concept of organizational learning and/or of "social learning" (as proposed byA.O. Hirschman in 1954). But few of them have payed specific attention to the existing link between the learning process and incentives. The aim of this paper is to emphasize this link. In the first part, it is shown that if it is logical to conceive incentive without learning (as stated by the mainstream model), the opposite relation (i.e.: learning without incentive) is not theorically justified. The second part develops this hypothesis through the notion of "gestural learning", straight from Biaise Pascal, which is not reduced to a question of imitation or moral hazard, and which can explain the apparently paradoxical survival of some inefficient economic policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Suzanne Quiers-Valette, 1999. "Apprentissage collectif et incitations. Une approche par l'apprentissage gestuel," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 50(5), pages 1029-1052.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1999_num_50_5_410130
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1999.410130
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1999.410130
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Olivier Favereau, 1989. "Marchés internes, marchés externes," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(2), pages 273-328.
    2. Vives, Xavier, 1996. "Social learning and rational expectations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 589-601, April.
    3. Martimort, David, 1996. "The multiprincipal nature of government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 673-685, April.
    4. Caillaud, B. & Jullien, B. & Picard, P., 1996. "Hierarchical organization and incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 687-695, April.
    5. Gale, Douglas, 1996. "What have we learned from social learning?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 617-628, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Hugon, 2002. "Les écarts de connaissances scientifiques et techniques Nord/Sud au regard de la théorie des biens publics mondiaux," Revue Tiers Monde, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(172), pages 891-913.

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