Relations de crédit de long terme et structure des marchés bancaires locaux
[eng] Long-term credit relationships and the structure of local banking markets This paper provides a spatial competition model of the banking sector, in which banks and firms can endure long-term relationships. We show that the fraction of borrowers with long-term contracts depends negatively on the number of banks. Considering sunk costs, we then show that the existence of long-term contracts leads to a decrease in the equilibrium number of banks. [fre] Cet article présente un modèle de concurrence spatiale du secteur bancaire, dans lequel les banques et les entreprises peuvent engager des relations de crédit de long terme. On montre que la proportion des emprunteurs ayant recours à des contrats de long terme dépend négativement du nombre de banques. En considérant l'existence de coûts fixes non récupérables, on montre ensuite que la présence de contrats de long terme dans l'économie implique un accroissement de la concentration du marché bancaire.
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Volume (Year): 47 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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