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Quelle légitimité à des mécanismes de régulation de l'offre dans les Appellations d'origine protégée?

Author

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  • Éric Giraud-Héraud
  • Louis-Georges Soler

Abstract

[fre] Les Appellations d'origine protégée européennes requièrent le plus souvent une régulation économique des quantités tout au long de la chaîne de production-commercialisation. En s'inspirant du secteur viticole, nous montrons dans cet article les arguments qui peuvent être avancés par rapport aux contraintes fixées par la politique de la concurrence. Nous proposons en outre un modèle économique formalisé qui explicite l'adéquation d'une telle régulation avec l'intérêt des consommateurs, en considérant, d'une part, le contrôle de l'offre par un monopole et, d'autre part, une décroissance de la qualité en fonction des quantités produites. [eng] Which justifica tion of supply regulation in the appellations of origin? - Supply control mechanisms are often required by the producers to manage European Protected Appellations of Origin. Such mechanisms are usually criticized by the competition policy makers because they decrease the consumer surplus. Nevertheless, they can have positive impacts when the product quality increases as the quantity decreases. In this paper, we propose an economic model based on the wine case which shows that, under some conditions, the gain of consumer surplus due to quality increasing can make up for the loss due to supply control.

Suggested Citation

  • Éric Giraud-Héraud & Louis-Georges Soler, 2003. "Quelle légitimité à des mécanismes de régulation de l'offre dans les Appellations d'origine protégée?," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 277(1), pages 123-134.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recoru:ecoru_0013-0559_2003_num_277_1_5441
    DOI: 10.3406/ecoru.2003.5441
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecoru.2003.5441
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Champsaur, Paul & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1989. "Multiproduct Duopolists," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 533-557, May.
    2. Motta, Massimo, 1993. "Endogenous Quality Choice: Price vs. Quantity Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 113-131, June.
    3. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    4. A. Michael Spence, 1975. "Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 417-429, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Irz, Xavier & Mazzocchi, Mario & Réquillart, Vincent & Soler, Louis-Georges, 2015. "Research in Food Economics: past trends and new challenges," Revue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement, Editions NecPlus, vol. 96(01), pages 187-237, March.
    2. Muller Paul & Böhm Michael & Csillag Péter & Donati Michele & Drut Marion & Ferrer-Pérez Hugo & Gauvrit Lisa & Gil Jose M. & Hoang Viet & Malak-Rawlikowska Agata & Mattas Konstadinos & Napasintuwong O, 2021. "Are Certified Supply Chains More Socially Sustainable? A Bargaining Power Analysis," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 177-192, December.

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