IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/plo/pone00/0272719.html

Eco-evolutionary dynamics of multigames with mutations

Author

Listed:
  • Sourav Roy
  • Sayantan Nag Chowdhury
  • Prakash Chandra Mali
  • Matjaž Perc
  • Dibakar Ghosh

Abstract

Most environments favor defection over cooperation due to natural selection. Nonetheless, the emergence of cooperation is omnipresent in many biological, social, and economic systems, quite contrary to the well-celebrated Darwinian theory of evolution. Much research has been devoted to better understanding how and why cooperation persists among self-interested individuals despite their competition for limited resources. Here we go beyond a single social dilemma since individuals usually encounter various social challenges. In particular, we propose and study a mathematical model incorporating both the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game. We further extend this model by considering ecological signatures like mutation and selfless one-sided contribution of altruist free space. The nonlinear evolutionary dynamics that results from these upgrades offer a broader range of equilibrium outcomes, and it also often favors cooperation over defection. With the help of analytical and numerical calculations, our theoretical model sheds light on the mechanisms that maintain biodiversity, and it helps to explain the evolution of social order in human societies.

Suggested Citation

  • Sourav Roy & Sayantan Nag Chowdhury & Prakash Chandra Mali & Matjaž Perc & Dibakar Ghosh, 2022. "Eco-evolutionary dynamics of multigames with mutations," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(8), pages 1-26, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0272719
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0272719
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0272719
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0272719&type=printable
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1371/journal.pone.0272719?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Li, Kun & Xu, Haocheng & Liu, Xiao, 2022. "Analysis and visualization of accidents severity based on LightGBM-TPE," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    2. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    3. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
    4. repec:fth:iniesr:487 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2006. "Imitation processes with small mutations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 251-262, November.
    6. Huang, Yi Jie & Deng, Zheng Hong & Song, Qun & Wu, Tao & Deng, Zhi Long & Gao, Ming yu, 2019. "The evolution of cooperation in multi-games with aspiration-driven updating rule," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 313-317.
    7. Gokhale, Chaitanya S. & Hauert, Christoph, 2016. "Eco-evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 28-42.
    8. Liu, Yujie & Li, Zemin & Jin, Xing & Tao, Yuchen & Ding, Hong & Wang, Zhen, 2022. "The effect of perceptions competition and learning costs on cooperation in spatial evolutionary multigames," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sun, Chengbin & de Miguel-Arribas, Alfonso & Wang, Chaoqian & Xia, Haoxiang & Moreno, Yamir, 2025. "Co-evolution of cooperation and resource allocation in the advantageous environment-based spatial multi-game using adaptive control," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 199(P1).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Veller, Carl & Hayward, Laura K., 2016. "Finite-population evolution with rare mutations in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 93-113.
    2. John T. Scholz & Cheng‐Lung Wang, 2009. "Learning to Cooperate: Learning Networks and the Problem of Altruism," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 572-587, July.
    3. Mookherjee, Dilip & Napel, Stefan, 2007. "Intergenerational mobility and macroeconomic history dependence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 49-78, November.
    4. Srinivas Arigapudi & Yuval Heller & Amnon Schreiber, 2023. "Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination," Papers 2305.10301, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2025.
    5. Madison S Krieger, 2023. "Evolutionary dynamics of hyperbolic language," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 19(2), pages 1-23, February.
    6. Michel BenaÔm & J–rgen W. Weibull, 2003. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 873-903, May.
    7. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2009. "Random matching in adaptive dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 98-114, May.
    8. Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2008. "Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1719-1741, October.
    9. Sandholm, William H., 2012. "Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 2056-2071.
    10. Kenichi Kurita & Shunsuke Managi, 2022. "COVID-19 and Stigma: Evolution of Self-restraint Behavior," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 168-182, March.
    11. Sandholm,W.H., 1998. "The evolution of preferences and rapid social change," Working papers 28, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    12. Dziubiński, Marcin & Roy, Jaideep, 2012. "Popularity of reinforcement-based and belief-based learning models: An evolutionary approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 433-454.
    13. Guth, Werner & Pull, Kerstin, 2004. "Will equity evolve?: an indirect evolutionary approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 273-282, March.
    14. Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2005. "The governance of innovative firms: An evolutionary perspective," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 125-147.
    15. Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H., 2001. "Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    16. Zhang, Huanren, 2018. "Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 203-219.
    17. Kevin Hasker, 2014. "The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000954, David K. Levine.
    18. Isaak Mengesha & Meiqi Sun & Debraj Roy, 2025. "Cognitive biases shape the evolution of zero-sum norms," Papers 2511.16453, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2026.
    19. Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2002. "Punctuality - A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium," Working Paper Series 582, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    20. Huw Dixon & Ernesto Somma, "undated". "Coordination and Equilibrium selection in mean defined supermodular games under payoff monotonic selection dynamics," Discussion Papers 99/37, Department of Economics, University of York.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0272719. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: plosone (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.