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Internal Controls in Ensuring Good Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions

  • Kosmas Njanike


    (Bindura University, Zimbabwe)

  • Margaret Mutengezanwa


    (Bindura University, Zimbabwe)

  • Fungai B. Gombarume


    (Bindura University, Zimbabwe)

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    This paper assessed factors that influence the internal controls in ensuring good corporate governance in financial institutions in developing economies with special reference to Zimbabwe. The research paper assessed how lack of internal controls affected good corporate governance and aimed to bring out elements of good corporate governance. It emerged that failure to effectively implement internal controls contributed significantly to poor corporate governance. The study discovered that internal control system overrides and the issue of “fact cat” directors also contributed to poor corporate governance. The study recommended that there is need for the board of directors to guarantee an organizational structure that clearly defines management responsibilities, authority and reporting relationships. There is also need to ensure that delegated responsibilities are effectively carried out to ensure compliance with internal controls of the financial institution concerned.

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    Article provided by University of Petrosani, Romania in its journal Annals of the University of Petrosani - Economics.

    Volume (Year): 11 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 187-196

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    Handle: RePEc:pet:annals:v:11:y:2011:i:1:p:187-196
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    1. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
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