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Risks to Reputation: A Global Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Sophie Gaultier-Gaillard

    (Prism-Sorbonne, Université Paris 1-Sorbonne (France))

  • Jean-Paul Louisot

    (CARM_Institute, Master Professionnel de Gestion Globale des Risques et des Crises, Université Paris 1-Panthéon/Sorbonne)

Abstract

Reputation is an intangible asset that directly affects the market value of the firm. Although reputation evidences belief that the firm is on a sustainable course, it is built on the trust established with all stakeholders through past proper behaviour. It proves more resilient than one might think at first but even menial misconducts, if repeated, can lead to a downfall. The demise of a few can engulf a whole industry when the transactions are based on trust in the fulfilment of future promises. This is why reputation has become an object of research for several branches of management sciences. The key drivers are still in need of refinement. Nevertheless, they can be summarized in one word: authenticity.

Suggested Citation

  • Sophie Gaultier-Gaillard & Jean-Paul Louisot, 2006. "Risks to Reputation: A Global Approach," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 31(3), pages 425-445, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:gpprii:v:31:y:2006:i:3:d:10.1057_palgrave.gpp.2510090
    DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.gpp.2510090
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    References listed on IDEAS

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