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El empleo de incentivos económicos de la protección del medio ambiente

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  • Alberto Pasco-Font
  • Andrés Montoya

Abstract

El presente artículo revisa los dos principales enfoques existentes para proteger el medio ambiente: la fijación y control de estándares de contaminación y el empleo de instrumentos económicos. El artículo discute las ventajas y desventajas de cada uno de estos enfoques y trata de explicar por qué el enfoque predominante es el de fijación de estándares a pesar de que el uso de incentivos económicos usualmente es más eficiente, en términos de costos, para reducir la contaminación. A su vez, se demuestra que las dos clases de instrumentos económicos –los basados en incentivos de cantidad y los que emplean controles de precios- conducen a resultados eficientes. Sin embargo, se verifica que dependiendo de las características específicas del problema que se quiere solucionar, los permisos de mercado pueden ser más apropiados que los impuestos a la contaminación o viceversa. El artículo presenta una tipología de las situaciones en las cuales uno de los instrumentos es mejor al otro.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Pasco-Font & Andrés Montoya, 1993. "El empleo de incentivos económicos de la protección del medio ambiente," Apuntes. Revista de ciencias sociales, Fondo Editorial, Universidad del Pacífico, vol. 20(32), pages 21-31.
    • Handle: RePEc:pai:apunup:es-32-03
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    References listed on IDEAS

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