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Insolvency Resolution and the Missing High-Yield Bond Markets

Author

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  • Bo Becker
  • Jens Josephson

Abstract

In many countries, poorly functioning bankruptcy procedures force viable but insolvent firms to restructure out of court, where banks may have a bargaining advantage over other creditors. We model the choice of restructuring process and derive implications for the corporate mix of bank and bond financing. Empirical patterns match the model: inefficient bankruptcy in a country is associated with less bond issuance by risky, but not by safe, borrowers. This pattern holds for both levels of and changes in bankruptcy recovery. Our results establish a link between bankruptcy reform and corporate bond markets, especially high-yield markets.Received September 29, 2014; accepted February 1, 2016 by Editor David Denis.

Suggested Citation

  • Bo Becker & Jens Josephson, 2016. "Insolvency Resolution and the Missing High-Yield Bond Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(10), pages 2814-2849.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:29:y:2016:i:10:p:2814-2849.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhw014
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    Cited by:

    1. Federico Esposito & Fadi Hassan, 2023. "Import competition, trade credit and financial frictions in general equilibrium," CEP Discussion Papers dp1901, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    2. Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Horváth, Bálint & Huizinga, Harry, 2023. "Loan recoveries and the financing of zombie firms over the business cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 18351, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Manuel Adelino & Miguel A Ferreira & Mariassunta Giannetti & Pedro Pires, 2023. "Trade Credit and the Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 36(2), pages 775-813.
    4. Darmouni, Olivier & Geisecke, Oliver & Rodnyanky, Alexander, 2019. "The Bond Lending Channel of Monetary Policy," MPRA Paper 95141, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Nicolas Crouzet, 2021. "Credit Disintermediation and Monetary Policy," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 69(1), pages 23-89, March.
    6. Elert, Niklas & Henrekson, Magnus & Stenkula, Mikael, 2017. "Institutional Reform for Innovation and Entrepreneurship: An Agenda for Europe," Working Paper Series 1150, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 16 Feb 2017.
    7. Neira, Julian, 2019. "Bankruptcy and cross-country differences in productivity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 359-381.
    8. Elert, Niklas & Henrekson, Magnus, 2021. "Innovative Entrepreneurship as a Collaborative Effort: An Institutional Framework," Foundations and Trends(R) in Entrepreneurship, now publishers, vol. 17(4), pages 330-435, June.
    9. Duffee, Gregory R. & Hördahl, Peter, 2025. "Debt specialization and diversification: International evidence," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    10. Fiorillo, Paolo & Meles, Antonio & Ricciardi, Antonio & Verdoliva, Vincenzo, 2025. "ESG performance and the cost of debt. Evidence from the corporate bond market," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    11. Ulrich Hege & Pierre Mella-Barral, 2019. "Bond Exchange Offers or Collective Action Clauses?," Finance, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, vol. 40(3), pages 77-119.
    12. Manthos D Delis & Sizhe Hong & Nikos Paltalidis & Dennis Philip, 2022. "Forward Guidance and Corporate Lending [Measuring euro area monetary policy]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 26(4), pages 899-935.
    13. Edward I. Altman & Rui Dai & Wei Wang, 2024. "Global zombie companies: measurements, determinants, and outcomes," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 55(6), pages 723-744, August.
    14. Amir Kermani & Yueran Ma, 2020. "Two Tales of Debt," NBER Working Papers 27641, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Chod, Jiri & Lyandres, Evgeny & Yang, S. Alex, 2019. "Trade credit and supplier competition," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(2), pages 484-505.
    16. Darmouni, Olivier & Papoutsi, Melina, 2022. "Non-bank lending to mid-size firms in Europe: evidence from corporate securities," Working Paper Series 2663, European Central Bank.
    17. Agrawal, Ashwini & González-Uribe, Juanita & Martínez-Correa, Jimmy, 2022. "Measuring the ex-ante incentive effects of creditor control rights during bankruptcy reorganization," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 381-408.
    18. He, Dongwei & Zhang, Zhen & Wang, Qiang, 2024. "Information disclosure strategies and bank interest rates pricing decisions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    19. Chen, Fang & Huang, Jing-Zhi & Sun, Zhenzhen & Yu, Tong, 2020. "Why do firms issue guaranteed bonds?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    20. Merton, Robert C. & Thakor, Richard T., 2022. "No-fault default, chapter 11 bankruptcy, and financial institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    21. Moritz Schularick, 2021. "Corporate indebtedness and macroeconomic stabilisation from a long-term perspective," ECONtribute Policy Brief Series 024, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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