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When is it Optimal to Abandon a Fixed Exchange Rate? -super-1

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  • Sergio Rebelo
  • Carlos A. Végh

Abstract

The influential Krugman-Flood-Garber (KFG) model of balance of payment crises assumes that a fixed exchange rate is abandoned if and only if international reserves reach a critical threshold value. From a positive standpoint, the KFG rule is at odds with many episodes in which the central bank has plenty of international reserves at the time of abandonment. We study the optimal exit policy and show that from a normative standpoint, the KFG rule is generally suboptimal. We consider a model in which the fixed exchange rate regime has become unsustainable due to an unexpected increase in government spending. We show that when there are no exit costs, it is optimal to abandon immediately. When there are exit costs, the optimal abandonment time is a decreasing function of the size of the fiscal shock. For large fiscal shocks, immediate abandonment is optimal. Our model is consistent with evidence suggesting that many countries exit fixed exchange rate regimes with still plenty of international reserves in the central bank's vault. Copyright 2008, Wiley-Blackwell.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergio Rebelo & Carlos A. Végh, 2008. "When is it Optimal to Abandon a Fixed Exchange Rate? -super-1," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(3), pages 929-955.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:75:y:2008:i:3:p:929-955
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00479.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Mr. Alejandro D Guerson, 2015. "Inflation Dynamics and Monetary Policy in Bolivia," IMF Working Papers 2015/266, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Mei Li & Junfeng Qiu, 2011. "Endogenous inflows of speculative capital and the optimal currency appreciation path," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 44(1), pages 364-379, February.
    4. Steiner, Andreas & Steinkamp, Sven & Westermann, Frank, 2019. "Exit strategies, capital flight and speculative attacks: Europe's version of the trilemma," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 83-96.
    5. Cesar M. Rodriguez, 2016. "Economic and political determinants of exchange rate regimes: The case of Latin America," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 147, pages 1-26.
    6. Lorenzoni, Guido, 2014. "International Financial Crises," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 689-740, Elsevier.
    7. Mitchener, Kris James & Pina, Gonçalo, 2020. "Pegxit pressure," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    8. Menna Bizuneh & Neven Valev, 2014. "The Devil you Know: Pegs vs Floats with Uncertain Outcomes," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 686-699, September.
    9. Nicolás Oviedo, 2022. "Deficit fiscal y tipo de cambio fijo: racionalizando una combinacion insostenible," Young Researchers Working Papers 3, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Oct 2022.
    10. Terence Tai-Leung Chong & Qing He & Wing Hong Chan, 2016. "From Fixed to Float: A Competing Risks Analysis," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 488-503, October.
    11. Betty C. Daniel, 2010. "Exchange Rate Crises and Fiscal Solvency," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(6), pages 1109-1135, September.
    12. Teimouri, Sheida & Zietz, Joachim, 2017. "Economic costs of alternative monetary policy responses to speculative currency attacks," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(PB), pages 419-434.
    13. Pina, Gonçalo, 2015. "The recent growth of international reserves in developing economies: A monetary perspective," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 172-190.
    14. Bitar, Joseph, 2021. "The unique dollarization case of Lebanon," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 45(2).

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