Bail-in: who invests in noncovered debt securities issued by euro area banks?
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Cited by:
- Marques-Ibanez, David & Santilli, Gianluca & Scardozzi, Giulia, 2024.
"Bail-in in action,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 241(C).
- Marqués-Ibáñez, David & Santilli, Gianluca & Scardozzi, Giulia, 2024. "Bail-in in action," Working Paper Series 2959, European Central Bank.
- Carmela Aurora Attinà & Pierluigi Bologna, 2021. "TLAC-eligible debt: who holds it? A view from the euro area," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 604, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Lorenzo Gai & Federica Ielasi & Martina Mainini, 2021. "The Impact of Bail-in Risk on Bank Bondholders," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 15(9), pages 105-105, July.
- Hüser, Anne-Caroline & Kok, Christoffer, 2019.
"Mapping bank securities across euro area sectors: comparing funding and exposure networks,"
Working Paper Series
2273, European Central Bank.
- Hüser, Anne-Caroline & Kok, Christoffer, 2019. "Mapping bank securities across euro area sectors: comparing funding and exposure networks," Bank of England working papers 795, Bank of England.
- Philipp Poyntner & Thomas Reininger, 2018. "Bail-in and Legacy Assets: Harmonized rules for targeted partial compensation to strengthen the bail-in regime," Working Papers 224, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
- Altavilla, Carlo & Fernandes, Cecilia Melo & Ongena, Steven & Scopelliti, Alessandro, 2022.
"Bank bond holdings and bail-in regulatory changes: evidence from euro area security registers,"
Working Paper Series
2758, European Central Bank.
- Carlo Altavilla & Cecilia Melo Fernandes & Steven Ongena & Alessandro Scopelliti, 2025. "Bank Bond Holdings and Bail-in Regulatory Changes: Evidence from Euro Area Security Registers," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 25-38, Swiss Finance Institute.
- Ulf Lewrick & José María Serena Garralda & Grant Turner, 2019. "Believing in bail-in? Market discipline and the pricing of bail-in bonds," BIS Working Papers 831, Bank for International Settlements.
- Allen N. Berger & Charles P. Himmelberg & Raluca A. Roman & Sergey Tsyplakov, 2022. "Bank bailouts, bail‐ins, or no regulatory intervention? A dynamic model and empirical tests of optimal regulation and implications for future crises," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 1031-1090, December.
- Paola Leone & Pasqualina Porretta & Luca Riccetti, 2021. "European Significant Bank Stock Market Volatility: Is there a Bail-In Effect?," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 14(5), pages 1-32, July.
- Farina, Tatiana & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Mecatti, Irene & Pelizzon, Loriana & Schlegel, Jonas & Tröger, Tobias, 2022. "Is there a "retail challenge" to banks' resolvability? What do we know about the holders of bail-inable securities in the Banking Union?," SAFE White Paper Series 92, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
- Peter Lindner & Vanessa Redak, 2017. "The resilience of households in bank bail-ins," Financial Stability Report, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 33, pages 88-101.
- Fiordelisi, Franco & Scardozzi, Giulia, 2022. "Bank funding strategy after the bail-in announcement," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
banking regulation; systemic risk; bail-in; contagion;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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