IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/now/fntacc/1400000043.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay

Author

Listed:
  • Ferri, Fabrizio
  • Göx, Robert

Abstract

This monograph explores the relation between corporate governance and executive compensation and evaluates the conditions under which shareholders can bene.t from the right to interfere with the pay setting process by voting on the compensation proposed by the board of directors (Say on Pay). The first part of the monograph lays out the theoretical framework. The second part provides an overview of the origins and country-specific differences in Say on Pay regulation and a detailed summary and evaluation of the empirical literature on the subject.

Suggested Citation

  • Ferri, Fabrizio & Göx, Robert, 2018. "Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay," Foundations and Trends(R) in Accounting, now publishers, vol. 12(1), pages 1-103, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:fntacc:1400000043
    DOI: 10.1561/1400000043
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1400000043
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1561/1400000043?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas, Randall S. & Cotter, James F., 2007. "Shareholder proposals in the new millennium: Shareholder support, board response, and market reaction," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 368-391, June.
    2. Monem, Reza & Ng, Chew, 2013. "Australia’s ‘two-strikes’ rule and the pay-performance link: Are shareholders judicious?," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 237-254.
    3. Kevin J. Murphy, 2012. "The Politics of Pay: A Legislative History of Executive Compensation," Chapters, in: Research Handbook on Executive Pay, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February.
    5. Jean Tirole, 2006. "The Theory of Corporate Finance," Post-Print hal-00173191, HAL.
    6. Powell, Daniel & Rapp, Marc Steffen, 2015. "Non-mandatory say on pay votes and AGM participation: Evidence from Germany," SAFE Working Paper Series 107, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dai, Na & Nahata, Rajarishi & Brauner, Aaron, 2022. "Does individualism matter for hedge funds? A cross-country examination," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    2. Shi, Lina & Gong, Stephen & Wang, Xingang, 2021. "Social network, corporate governance, and rent extraction in CEO compensation: Evidence from spatial econometric models," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(4).
    3. Göx, Robert F. & Hemmer, Thomas, 2020. "On the relation between managerial power and CEO pay," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    2. Simon Rafaqat & Sana Rafaqat & Sahil Rafaqat & Saoul Rafaqat & Dawood Rafaqat, 2023. "Shareholder Activism and Firm Performance: A Review," Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies, AMH International, vol. 14(4), pages 31-41.
    3. Edina Berlinger & Anita Lovas & Péter Juhász, 2017. "State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 25(4), pages 743-770, December.
    4. Dang, Viet Anh, 2010. "Optimal financial contracts with hidden effort, unobservable profits and endogenous costs of effort," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 75-89, February.
    5. Cullinan, Charles P. & Mahoney, Lois & Roush, Pamela B., 2017. "Are CSR activities associated with shareholder voting in director elections and say-on-pay votes?," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 225-243.
    6. Mikel Bedayo & Raquel Vegas & Gabriel Jiménez & José-Luis Peydró, 2020. "Screening and Loan Origination Time: Lending Standards, Loan Defaults and Bank Failures," Working Papers 1215, Barcelona School of Economics.
    7. Ilya Ivaninskiy & Irina Ivashkovskaya & Joseph A. McCahery, 2023. "Does digitalization mitigate or intensify the principal-agent conflict in a firm?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 27(3), pages 695-725, September.
    8. Enikolopov, Ruben & Petrova, Maria & Stepanov, Sergey, 2014. "Firm value in crisis: Effects of firm-level transparency and country-level institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 72-84.
    9. Carsten Eckel & Florian Unger, 2023. "Credit Constraints, Endogenous Innovations, And Price Setting In International Trade," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(4), pages 1715-1747, November.
    10. John García & Francesc Trillas, 2011. "Control corporativo y riqueza de los accionistas en el sector eléctrico europeo (2000-2007)," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 13(25), pages 297-319, July-Dece.
    11. Falavigna, Greta & Ippoliti, Roberto, 2023. "SMEs’ behavior under financial constraints: An empirical investigation on the legal environment and the substitution effect with tax arrears," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    12. Jukka Isohätälä & Alistair Milne & Donald Robertson, 2020. "The Net Worth Trap: Investment and Output Dynamics in the Presence of Financing Constraints," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(8), pages 1-32, August.
    13. Isabelle Brocas, 2005. "Multistage Contracting with Applications to R&D and Insurance Policies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 317-346, May.
    14. Dirk Niepelt, 2020. "Reserves for All? Central Bank Digital Currency, Deposits, and Their (Non)-Equivalence," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(3), pages 211-238, June.
    15. Christoph Börner & Dietmar Grichnik & Frank Reize, 2010. "Finanzierungsentscheidungen mittelständischer Unternehmer — Einflussfaktoren der Fremdfinanzierung deutscher KMU," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 227-275, March.
    16. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Szilagyi, P.G., 2009. "Shareholder Activism through the Proxy Process," Other publications TiSEM cc25d736-2965-4511-b100-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    17. Nils aus dem Moore, 2014. "Taxes and Corporate Financing Decisions – Evidence from the Belgian ACE Reform," Ruhr Economic Papers 0533, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    18. Xu, Jiajun & Ru, Xinshun & Song, Pengcheng, 2021. "Can a new model of infrastructure financing mitigate credit rationing in poorly governed countries?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 111-120.
    19. Li, Yuanyuan & Wigniolle, Bertrand, 2017. "Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 127-141.
    20. Mike Burkart & Konrad Raff, 2015. "Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1383-1414.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Managerial behavior; Stakeholders; Accounting research;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:now:fntacc:1400000043. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lucy Wiseman (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.nowpublishers.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.