Destructive creativity implies that parasites become more efficient in rent extraction. We focus on destructive creativity in situations where parasites live on rents extracted from the producers. A higher parasitic strength implies that the waste associated with rent seeking increases, and in the long run erodes business productivity, implying that the sustainability of predation is threatened by improved efficiency.
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