Entrepreneurship and Rent-Seeking Behavior
In this chapter, we propose a primer of the treatment that has received in the economic literature the problematic of entrepreneurship and rent-seeking behavior. It comprises the introduction of employed concepts, the discussion of the allocation of entrepreneurs between different types of economic projects, namely between innovative entrepreneurship and rent-seeking, as well as the explicative factors of the allocation. Interactions between entrepreneurship, rent-seeking and growth are considered (also for a reference situation departing from the first best). Some policy implications are finally briefly evoked.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published, Handbook of Research on Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Edward Elgar (Ed.), 2011, 17-23|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00616302/en/|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ |
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