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Entrepreneurship and Rent-Seeking Behavior

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  • Marcus Dejardin

    () (CERPE, Department of economics, University of Namur-FUNDP)

Abstract

In this chapter, we propose a primer of the treatment that has received in the economic literature the problematic of entrepreneurship and rent-seeking behavior. It comprises the introduction of employed concepts, the discussion of the allocation of entrepreneurs between different types of economic projects, namely between innovative entrepreneurship and rent-seeking, as well as the explicative factors of the allocation. Interactions between entrepreneurship, rent-seeking and growth are considered (also for a reference situation departing from the first best). Some policy implications are finally briefly evoked.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcus Dejardin, 2011. "Entrepreneurship and Rent-Seeking Behavior," Working Papers 1112, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:nam:wpaper:1112
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 503-530.
    5. Mohtadi, Hamid & Roe, Terry L., 2003. "Democracy, rent seeking, public spending and growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 445-466, March.
    6. Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl & Torvik, Ragnar, 2003. "Predator or prey?: Parasitic enterprises in economic development," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 275-294, April.
    7. Baland, Jean-Marie & Francois, Patrick, 2000. "Rent-seeking and resource booms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 527-542, April.
    8. Douhan, Robin & Henrekson, Magnus, 2008. "Productive and Destructive Entrepreneurship in a Political Economy Framework," Working Paper Series 761, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    9. Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Adelino, Manuel & Dinc, I. Serdar, 2014. "Corporate distress and lobbying: Evidence from the Stimulus Act," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 256-272.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Entrepreneurship; Rent-seeking; Economic development;

    JEL classification:

    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General

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