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Verbal Interventions as a Factor of Inflation Expectations in Russia

Author

Listed:
  • Zhemkov, M.

    (Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia), Moscow, Russia)

  • Kuznetsova, O.

    (International Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

Stability of inflation expectations is a necessary part of inflation targeting. Among many factors that may affect the dynamics of inflation expectations, one of the most important is the communication policy of the central bank and representatives of the government. This paper measures the effectiveness of verbal interventions by the Government and the Bank of Russia on the high-frequency indicator of inflation expectations from the stock market for the period July 2015 - December 2016. Dummy variables are used to characterize verbal interventions in terms of the degree of regularity, the source and the information contained. One of the main features of this paper is the analysis of the verbal interventions from individual representatives of monetary and fiscal policies. By the assessment of the model of conditional heteroscedasticity, we conclude that verbal interventions by the Bank of Russia and members of the Government of the Russian Federation accompanied by decrease of inflation expectations: key verbal interventions were statements about state budget deficit and future inflation. The results obtained can be used to develop the communication policy tools in future.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhemkov, M. & Kuznetsova, O., 2019. "Verbal Interventions as a Factor of Inflation Expectations in Russia," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 49-69.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2019:i:42:p:49-69
    DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2019-42-2-3
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    inflation expectations; verbal interventions; communication policy; The Central Bank of Russian Federation; GARCH;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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