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Corruption and Deforestation: A Differential Game Model

Author

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  • Cassandro Mendes
  • Sabino Junior
  • Fabricio Tourruc?o

Abstract

Deforestation is a global issue and recently has been given much attention by governments and international institutions. The present paper aims to present a simple theoretical model on the relationship between corruption and deforestation. To model such relationship, we used differential games. Our model suggests that corruption increases deforestation. Moreover, the salary paid in the public sector may be an important tool to fight deforestation in development countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Cassandro Mendes & Sabino Junior & Fabricio Tourruc?o, 2016. "Corruption and Deforestation: A Differential Game Model," Business and Economic Research, Macrothink Institute, vol. 6(1), pages 481-491, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:mth:ber888:v:6:y:2016:i:1:p:481-491
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amacher, Gregory S., 2006. "Corruption: A challenge for economists interested in forest policy design," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 85-89, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deforestation; Corruption; Differential game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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