The Questionable Efficiency of the Efficient-Breach Doctrine
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References listed on IDEAS
- Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Introduction to Behavioral Economics and Its Applications," Introductory Chapters,in: Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen (ed.), Behavioral Economics and Its Applications Princeton University Press.
- Broome,John, 1999. "Ethics out of Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521642750, December.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Urs Schweizer, 2012. "The Questionable Efficiency of the Efficient-Breach Doctrine," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, pages 32-37.
- Oren Bar-Gill & Christoph Engel, 2016.
"Bargaining in the Absence of Property Rights: An Experiment,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 477-495.
- Oren Bar-Gill & Christoph Engel, 2015. "Bargaining in the Absence of Property Rights: An Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_19, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Alan D. Schwartz, 2012. "The Questionable Efficiency of the Efficient-Breach Doctrine," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, pages 27-31.
- Engel, Christoph & Beckenkamp, Martin & Glöckner, Andreas & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike & Kube, Sebastian & Kurschilgen, Michael & Morell, Alexander & Nicklisch, Andreas & Normann, Hans-, 2014. "First impressions are more important than early intervention: Qualifying broken windows theory in the lab," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, pages 126-136.
- Christoph Engel & Lars Freund, 2017. "Behaviorally Efficient Remedies – An Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2017_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
More about this item
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
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