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Norm Enforcement: The Role of Third Parties

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  • Jeffrey P. Carpenter
  • Peter Hans Matthews

Abstract

To be effective, norm enforcement often requires the participation of unaffected third parties. The logic of third-party intervention has, however, proven elusive because the costs always seem to outweigh the benefits. Using an evolutionary game theoretic approach, we posit that the intervention of unaffected bystanders is a triggered normative response and show that generalized punishment norms survive in one of the two stable equilibria subject to selection drift.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey P. Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2010. "Norm Enforcement: The Role of Third Parties," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 239-258, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201006)166:2_239:netrot_2.0.tx_2-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Third Party Punishment and Social Norms," IEW - Working Papers 106, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2000-02, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    3. Bendor, Jonathan & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1990. "Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and Cooperation," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 33-63, Spring.
    4. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert & Hwang, Sung-Ha, 2009. "Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 221-232, August.
    5. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lisa Bruttel & Werner G�th, 2013. "Tit for Others' Tat. Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments with Third-Party Monitoring and Indirect Punishment," TWI Research Paper Series 85, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    2. Fangfang Tan & Erte Xiao, 2014. "Third-Party Punishment: Retribution or Deterrence?," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-05, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    3. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews, 2009. "What norms trigger punishment?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(3), pages 272-288, September.
    4. Donna Harris & Benedikt Herrmann & Andreas Kontoleon & Jonathan Newton, 2015. "Is it a norm to favour your own group?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(3), pages 491-521, September.
    5. Butler, Je rey V. & Conzo, Pierluigi & Leroch, Martin A., 2013. "Social Identity and Punishment," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201329, University of Turin.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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