Corporate Governance and the Determinants of Investment
We use investment-cash flow regressions to show that both asymmetric-information and agency problems are more severe in Continental Europe than in the Anglo-Saxon countries leading to too little investment by firms with attractive investment opportunities and too much by those with poor investment opportunities. Legal systems, accounting standards, and ownership structure systematically affect the investment-cash flow sensitivity. Cash flow coefficients are largest for family-controlled firms in Europe.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 163 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.mohr.de/jite|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Timothy Erickson & Toni M. Whited, 2000. "Measurement Error and the Relationship between Investment and q," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 1027-1057, October.
- Heitor Almeida & Murillo Campello & Michael S. Weisbach, 2004. "The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1777-1804, August.
- Audretsch, David B. & Elston, Julie Ann, 2002.
"Does firm size matter? Evidence on the impact of liquidity constraints on firm investment behavior in Germany,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Audretsch, David B & Elston, Julie Ann, 1994. "Does Firm Size Matter? Evidence on the Impacts of Liquidity Constraints on Firm Investment Behaviour in Germany," CEPR Discussion Papers 1072, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Russell Cooper & Joao Ejarque, 2003. "Financial Frictions and Investment: Requiem in Q," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(4), pages 710-728, October.
- Grabowski, Henry G & Mueller, Dennis C, 1972. "Managerial and Stockholder Welfare Models of Firm Expenditures," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 54(1), pages 9-24, February.
- Degryse, Hans & de Jong, Abe, 2006. "Investment and internal finance: Asymmetric information or managerial discretion?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 125-147, January.
- Degryse, H. & de Jong, A., 2001. "Investment and Internal Finance: Asymmetric Information or Managerial Discretion?," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2001-86-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
- Aydogan Alti, 2003. "How Sensitive Is Investment to Cash Flow When Financing Is Frictionless?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 707-722, April.
- Audretsch, David B. & Elston, Julie Ann, 2002. "Does firm size matter? Evidence on the impact of liquidity constraints on firm investment behavior in Germany," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Audretsch, David B. & Elston, Julie Ann, 2000. "Does firm size matter? Evidence on the impact of liquidity constraint on firm investment behavior in Germany," HWWA Discussion Papers 113, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).