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Behavioral and Experimental Economics Do Inform Public Policy

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  • Arno Riedl

Abstract

Experimental and behavioral economics are well-established branches of economic science. This essay presents and discusses some results and behavioral regularities from these fields, which are of potential and actual importance for public policy. After a brief introduction to what experimental and behavioral economics are, some important behavioral regularities - presentation and framing effects, prosocial behavior, and reciprocity - are introduced, and it is reported how they interact with prominent trading institutions, taxation, and social and individual well-being. Throughout, some implications for public policy are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Arno Riedl, 2010. "Behavioral and Experimental Economics Do Inform Public Policy," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 66(1), pages 65-95, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201003)66:1_65:baeedi_2.0.tx_2-x
    DOI: 10.1628/001522108X503389
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Armin Falk & James J. Heckman, 2009. "Lab Experiments are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences," Working Papers 200935, Geary Institute, University College Dublin.
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    8. Coats, Jennifer C. & Gronberg, Timothy J. & Grosskopf, Brit, 2009. "Simultaneous versus sequential public good provision and the role of refunds -- An experimental study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 326-335, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Comeig, Irene & Klaser, Klaudijo & Pinar, Lucía D., 2022. "The paradox of (Inter)net neutrality: An experiment on ex-ante antitrust regulation✰," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).
    2. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2014. "Experiments on Monetary Policy and Central Banking," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments in Macroeconomics, volume 17, pages 167-227, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    3. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2015. "Macro-expérimentation autour des fonctions des banques centrales," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(2), pages 3-47.
    4. Weber, Matthias, 2019. "Behavioral Optimal Taxation: The Case of Aspirations," SocArXiv fpnw6, Center for Open Science.
    5. Doerrenberg, Philipp & Duncan, Denvil, 2014. "Tax Incidence in the Presence of Tax Evasion," IZA Discussion Papers 8137, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Matthias Weber, 2021. "Behavioral optimal taxation: Aspirations," Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE), vol. 5(1), pages 19-26, Septembre.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public economics; experimental economics; behavioral economics; public policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General

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