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EU Financing and Regional Policy: Vertical Fiscal Externalities when Capital is Mobile

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  • Robert Fenge
  • Matthias Wrede

Abstract

This paper considers the EU regional policy and analyzes two kinds of externalities that can explain why matching grants are used to subsidize regional infrastructure: horizontal pecuniary externalities via capital markets, and positive vertical fiscal externalities created by the financing of the EU budget. Matching grants should correct for both externalities. As an extension the paper considers possible alternatives of the EU financing system and malevolent governments. While a tax on the GDP of the member states would increase the vertical fiscal externality, governments that misuse funds decrease it. However, calculations of the size of externalities show that matching grant rates needed for internalization are quite low.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Fenge & Matthias Wrede, 2007. "EU Financing and Regional Policy: Vertical Fiscal Externalities when Capital is Mobile," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 63(4), pages 457-476, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200712)63:4_457:efarpv_2.0.tx_2-t
    DOI: 10.1628/001522107X268970
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Thiess Buettner & Robert Schwager & Sebastian Hauptmeier, 2011. "Efficient Revenue Sharing and Upper-Level Governments: Theory and Application to Germany," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(4), pages 647-667, December.
    2. Caterina Liesegang & Marco Runkel, 2009. "Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals and Fiscal Equalization," CESifo Working Paper Series 2747, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Ivo Bischoff & Frédéric Blaeschke, 2012. "Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201212, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    4. Bischoff, Ivo, 2008. "Conditional Grants, Grant-Seeking and Welfare when there is Government Failure on the Subordinate Level," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-031, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    5. Michael Keen & Kai A. Konrad, 2012. "International Tax Competition and Coordination," Working Papers international_tax_competi, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    6. Caterina Liesegang & Marco Runkel, 2016. "Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization under Corporate Income Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 6011, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    European economics; regional policy; intergovernmental grants; vertical fiscal externalities;

    JEL classification:

    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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