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Az elvakultság ökonómiája
[The economy of mental infatuation]

Author

Listed:
  • Hámori, Balázs

Abstract

A szerte a világban - Magyarországon is - mind jobban terjedő szekták az utóbbi időben nemcsak a szociológusok vagy teológusok kutatási tárgyai, de a közgazdászok figyelmét is magukra vonták. Első pillantásra ugyanis nehezen fér össze a racionálisan cselekvő homo oeconomicus feltételezésével az a tény, hogy a híveiktől nagy áldozatokat, önfeladást, lemondást követelő, olykor társadalmi kiközösítést is kiváltó mikroközösségek sokszor igen sikeresek, s tagjaik száma - az általános szekularizációs trendek ellenére - gyorsan gyarapodik. A szekták némelyikére jellemző kérlelhetetlenség, elvakultság csak látszólag irracionális. Valójában a magas belépési költségek és áldozatok a potyautasok kiszűrését szolgálják. A hit ugyanis közjószág, amelynek kínálata - más közjószágokéhoz hasonlóan - elégtelen lenne, ha a vallási közösséget potyautasok gyengítenék. A szekták nem csupán elvesznek tagjaiktól, hanem nyújtanak is számukra valamit: a tág értelemben vett üdvjavakat, amelyek fogalma messze többet foglal magában a közös hitnél és a transzcendentális élményeknél. Az üdvjavak nagyon is evilági szükségleteket elégítenek ki. A cikk végén a szerző érinti e különleges vallási csoportok növekedési és egyensúlyi problémáit. Mások választása pozitív externális hatást gyakorol a szektákhoz csatlakozóra, minél többen választanak tehát egy ilyen közösséget, annál valószínűbb, hogy a jövőben is többen fogják választani. Ugyanakkor a szekták növekedése növeli a potyautasok megjelenésének esélyét, amely állapot újabb szekták, újabb mozgalmak után kiált.

Suggested Citation

  • Hámori, Balázs, 1995. "Az elvakultság ökonómiája [The economy of mental infatuation]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 860-870.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:47
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, 1994. "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 3-31, February.
    2. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October.
    3. Azzi, Corry & Ehrenberg, Ronald G, 1975. "Household Allocation of Time and Church Attendance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(1), pages 27-56, February.
    4. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817.
    5. Iannaccone, Laurence R, 1992. "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(2), pages 271-291, April.
    6. Joe L Wallis, 1991. "Church Ministry and the Free Rider Problem:," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 183-196, April.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory

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