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A magyar önkormányzati eladósodás és válságkezelés nemzetközi összehasonlításban
[The indebtedness and crisis management of Hungarian municipalities in an international context]

Author

Listed:
  • Bethlendi, András
  • Lentner, Csaba

Abstract

Tanulmányunk célja, hogy nemzetközi összehasonlításban mutassa be a magyar önkormányzati szektor eladósodását és válságkezelését. A hazai önkormányzatok pénzügyi válságának kialakulásához atipikus tényezők is hozzájárultak. Jó néhány önkormányzat spekulatív céllal vett fel alacsony kamatozású devizahiteleket, s ezekkel gyakorlatilag úgynevezett carry trade ügyletekbe fogott. A nem kellően átgondolt központi fejlesztési támogatások szintén gyengítették az önkormányzatok pénzügyi stabilitását. A magyar önkormányzati konszolidáció a rendkívüli költségvetési támogatás mellett nemzetközi összehasonlításban újszerű eljárásokat is tartalmazott. A nemzetközi tapasztalatokkal összhangban a központi pénzügyi segítségnyújtás Magyarországon is együtt járt a központi költségvetési ellenőrzés erősítésével.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kódok: E62, H12, H74.

Suggested Citation

  • Bethlendi, András & Lentner, Csaba, 2019. "A magyar önkormányzati eladósodás és válságkezelés nemzetközi összehasonlításban [The indebtedness and crisis management of Hungarian municipalities in an international context]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 1013-1030.
  • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1866
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2019.10.1013
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Zhongjin Lu & Ms. Eva Jenkner, 2014. "Sub-National Credit Risk and Sovereign Bailouts: Who Pays the Premium?," IMF Working Papers 2014/020, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Beck, Roland & Ferrucci, Gianluigi & Hantzsche, Arno & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2017. "Determinants of sub-sovereign bond yield spreads – The role of fiscal fundamentals and federal bailout expectations," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 72-98.
    3. Lili Liu & Michael Waibel, 2009. "Subnational Insolvency and Governance: Cross-country Experiences and Lessons," Chapters, in: Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio (ed.), Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction?, chapter 13, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Seitz, Helmut, 2000. "Fiscal Policy, Deficits and Politics of Subnational Governments: The Case of the German Laender," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 183-218, March.
    5. Csaba Lentner, 2014. "The Debt Consolidation of Hungarian Local Governments," Public Finance Quarterly, State Audit Office of Hungary, vol. 59(3), pages 310-325.
    6. Manuel Pedro Rodríguez Bolívar & Andrés Navarro Galera & Laura Alcaide Muñoz & María Deseada López Subires, 2016. "Analyzing Forces to the Financial Contribution of Local Governments to Sustainable Development," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 8(9), pages 1-18, September.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing

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