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Car drivers' willingness to pay for not losing their driving licence

Author

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  • Finn Jøgensen
  • Tore Wentzel-Larsen

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Finn Jøgensen & Tore Wentzel-Larsen, 2002. "Car drivers' willingness to pay for not losing their driving licence," Transportation, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 271-286, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:transp:v:29:y:2002:i:3:p:271-286
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1015637012059
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Shavell, Steven, 1993. "The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 255-287, April.
    3. Hanemann, W Michael, 1991. "Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 635-647, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jørgensen, Finn & Dargay, Joyce, 2007. "Inferring price elasticities of car use and moral costs of driving without a licence," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 49-55, January.
    2. Angell, Blake & Cullen, Patricia & Laba, Tracey & Lung, Tom & Shanahan, Marian & Sakashita, Chika & Eades, Sandra & Ivers, Rebecca & Jan, Stephen, 2018. "What is the value of a driver licence? A contingent valuation study of Australian adults," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 25-34.

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