IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/theord/v58y2005i3p239-282.html

Economic Modeling Triggers More Efficient Planning: An Experimental Justification

Author

Listed:
  • Jean Ponssard

  • Olivier Saulpic

Abstract

Consider a firm as an organization that needs to efficiently coordinate several specialized departments in an uncertain environment. Decision making involves collective planning sessions and decentralized operational processes. In this setting this paper explores the role of economic modeling through an experimental game. Results support the idea that economic modeling favors higher performance. Economic modeling facilitates the emergence of common knowledge and the decomposition of a group decision problem into individual decision problems that are meaningfully interrelated. Copyright Springer 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Ponssard & Olivier Saulpic, 2005. "Economic Modeling Triggers More Efficient Planning: An Experimental Justification," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 239-282, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:58:y:2005:i:3:p:239-282
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-005-6593-2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-005-6593-2
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11238-005-6593-2?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jacques Cremer, 1980. "A Partial Theory of the Optimal Organization of a Bureaucracy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 683-693, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:dau:papers:123456789/3143 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Nicolas Berland & Jean-Pierre Ponssard & Olivier Saulpic, 2005. "Une typologie des systèmes de contrôle inspirée du cadre théorique de Simons," Working Papers hal-00243012, HAL.
    3. Nicolas Berland & Jean-Pierre Ponssard & Olivier Saulpic, 2006. "Recurrent Attempts to Renovate Management ControlRevisited through a Simons' Perspective," Working Papers hal-00243033, HAL.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/3053 is not listed on IDEAS

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 2000. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(2), pages 359-378.
    2. Boyarchenko, Svetlana & Machowska, Dominika & Topolyan, Iryna, 2025. "Supermodularity and incentive reversal in teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 93-105.
    3. Birger Wernerfelt, 2007. "Delegation, Committees, and Managers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 35-51, March.
    4. Prat, A., 1998. "How Homogeneous Should a Team Be?," Discussion Paper 1998-45, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland & Chenggang Xu, 2001. "Attribute Coordination in Organizations," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 2(2), pages 487-518, November.
    6. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2009. "Information technology: Efficient restructuring and the productivity puzzle," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 916-929, December.
    7. Hoang, Daniel & Gatzer, Sebastian & Ruckes, Martin E., 2018. "The economics of capital allocation in firms: Evidence from internal capital markets," Working Paper Series in Economics 115, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    8. Hans Degryse & Luc Laeven & Steven Ongena, 2009. "The Impact of Organizational Structure and Lending Technology on Banking Competition," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 13(2), pages 225-259.
    9. Masahiko Aoki, 2003. "T-forms of Organization Revisited and A Trans-disciplinary Framework for Institutional Analysis," Discussion papers 03004, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    10. Philippe Jehiel, 1999. "Information Aggregation and Communication in Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(5), pages 659-669, May.
    11. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2007. "Protocol Design and (De-)Centralization," CEPR Discussion Papers 6357, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    12. Wouter Dessein & Tano Santos, 2003. "The Demand for Coordination," NBER Working Papers 10056, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Xiang, Wang, 2020. "Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    14. Friebel, Guido & Raith, Michael, 2006. "Resource Allocation and Firm Scope," IZA Discussion Papers 2249, IZA Network @ LISER.
    15. Takashi Ui, 2009. "Bayesian potentials and information structures: Team decision problems revisited," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 5(3), pages 271-291, September.
    16. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard & Xu, Cheng-Gang, 2003. "Coordinating tasks in M-form and U-form organisations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3746, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Prat, Andrea, 2002. "Should a team be homogeneous?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1187-1207, July.
    18. Grüner, Hans Peter & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2010. "Speed and quality of collective decision making: Incentives for information provision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 734-747, December.
    19. Stennek, Johan, 1994. "Does Competition Make Firms More Flexible? A Study of Limited Managerial Cognition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 279-300, Summer.
    20. Saikat Datta, 1996. "On Control Losses In Hierarchies," Rationality and Society, , vol. 8(4), pages 387-412, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:58:y:2005:i:3:p:239-282. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.