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Property Rights and the New Institutional Arrangement for Product Innovation in Silicon Valley

  • Hirokazu Takizawa
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    This paper surveys researches on the new institutional arrangements for product innovation emerging in Silicon Valley. Special reference is made to the characteristics that go beyond the traditional property rights framework. First, the complicated patterns in allocation of control rights observed in VC contracts are examined to show the limit of Grosman-Hart-Moore framework. Second, the unique informational arrangement in Silicon Valley is explained as a second-best solution to the team-theoretic coordination problems in modular environments. Third, the paper examines the mechanism of ex post evolutionary formation of a product system. The paper concludes by suggesting future direction for research, including further research on the role of innovation commons in this process.

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    File URL: http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/03e009.pdf
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    Paper provided by Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) in its series Discussion papers with number 03009.

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    Length: 33 pages
    Date of creation: Feb 2003
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:03009
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    1. Teece, David J., 1986. "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 285-305, December.
    2. Mayer, Colin, 2002. "Financing the New Economy: financial institutions and corporate governance," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 311-326, June.
    3. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315, 04.
    4. Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    5. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
    6. Oliver Hart, 2001. "Financial Contracting," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1924, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    7. Clayton M. Christensen & Matt Verlinden & George Westerman, 2002. "Disruption, disintegration and the dissipation of differentiability," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(5), pages 955-993, November.
    8. Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 1777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1994. "Complementarities and systems: Understanding japanese economic organization," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 9(1), pages 3-42.
    10. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1992. "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 473-94, July.
    11. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Governance of the New Enterprise," NBER Working Papers 7958, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Aoki, Masahiko, 1994. "The Contingent Governance of Teams: Analysis of Institutional Complementarity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(3), pages 657-76, August.
    13. Schaefer, Scott, 1999. "Product design partitions with complementary components," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 311-330, March.
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