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Property Rights and the New Institutional Arrangement for Product Innovation in Silicon Valley

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  • Hirokazu Takizawa

Abstract

This paper surveys researches on the new institutional arrangements for product innovation emerging in Silicon Valley. Special reference is made to the characteristics that go beyond the traditional property rights framework. First, the complicated patterns in allocation of control rights observed in VC contracts are examined to show the limit of Grosman-Hart-Moore framework. Second, the unique informational arrangement in Silicon Valley is explained as a second-best solution to the team-theoretic coordination problems in modular environments. Third, the paper examines the mechanism of ex post evolutionary formation of a product system. The paper concludes by suggesting future direction for research, including further research on the role of innovation commons in this process.

Suggested Citation

  • Hirokazu Takizawa, 2003. "Property Rights and the New Institutional Arrangement for Product Innovation in Silicon Valley," Discussion papers 03009, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    • Handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:03009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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