Pure-strategy Equilibria with Non-expected Utility Players
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References listed on IDEAS
- Crawford, Vincent P., 1990. "Equilibrium without independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 127-154, February.
- Hong, Chew Soo & Karni, Edi & Safra, Zvi, 1987. "Risk aversion in the theory of expected utility with rank dependent probabilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 370-381, August.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Uwe Dulleck & Andreas Loffler, 2012. "μ-σ Games," NCER Working Paper Series 78, National Centre for Econometric Research.
- Rindone, Fabio & Greco, Salvatore & Di Gaetano, Luigi, 2013. "On prospects and games: an equilibrium analysis under prospect theory," MPRA Paper 52131, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Rieger, Marc Oliver, 2014. "Evolutionary stability of prospect theory preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 1-11.
- William S. Neilson, 2000. "Victory and Defeat in a Model of Behavior in Games and Toward Risk," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0690, Econometric Society.
- Han Bleichrodt & Chen Li & Ivan Moscati & Peter P. Wakker, 2016. "Nash was a first to axiomatize expected utility," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 309-312, September.
More about this item
KeywordsGame theory; Pure strategies; Risk; Non-expected utility;
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