Does Aftermarket Monopolization Facilitate Upstream Collusion?
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09997-3
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More about this item
Keywords
Collusion stability; Aftermarket monopoly; Lock-in effect; Vertical market;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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